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I. INTRODUCTION
"The conventional view serves to protect us
from the painful job of thinking. "
During the last quarter of a century, mutual funds in the United
States achieved a remarkable degree of public acceptance as a
means of investing in securities. The change is manifested in both
the number and assets of mutual funds. Between 1980 and 2006,
for example, the number of mutual funds grew from fewer than
600 to more than 8100, and the assets managed by mutual funds
expanded from approximately $135 billion to $10.4 trillion.2 The
increased popularity of mutual funds has made the funds an impor-
tant factor in the financial well-being of Americans-in 2006, mu-
tual fund shares were owned by nearly half of all U.S. households
and mutual funds held almost one-fourth of the total financial as-
sets of U.S. households.3 Given the current importance of mutual
funds, instances of exploitation of fund shareholders may damage
the economic welfare of individuals and reduce investments in se-
curities by the public.
I John Kenneth Galbraith, quoted in The Quotations Page, Michael Mon-
cur's (Cynical) Quotations, http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/l1267.html
(last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
2 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 2007 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT
BOOK 93 (47th ed. 2007), available at http://www.icifactbook.org. The data in
the text for the number and assets of funds include money market funds. The
number of funds from 1940 to 2006 is visually depicted in the instant article in-
fra in Figure 1.
3 Id. at 12, 58. Money market funds are evidently counted in the percentage
of households with an investment in a mutual fund.
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Under its mandate to protect investors in mutual funds, the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission ("Commission") has, since
2001,4 devoted considerable attention to the boards of directors of
the funds.5 In particular, the Commission has acted to require funds
to fill more seats on their boards with "independent" directors and
thus to exceed the minimum percentage of independent directors
specified by Congress in the Investment Company Act ("Act"), the
principal federal statute governing mutual funds.6 The instant arti-
cle explores the basis of the actions that have been taken by the
Commission and by Congress to regulate the composition of fund
boards.
An overview of the article may be helpful. I begin with an ex-
planation of the distinction currently made by the Act between "in-
terested" directors and non-interested directors. This distinction is
important because the Act requires that non-interested directors,
i.e., directors who are "independent," hold at least 40% of the seats
on the board of a registered investment company. 7 With this back-
ground, I review a measure that has been implemented, as well as a
measure that has been proposed, by the Commission to increase
further the percentage of fund directors who are independent and
reduce the percentage of directors who are interested.
The difference between interested and non-interested directors
forms the foundation for my analysis. In particular, I identify the
rationale that has been advanced by Congress and by the Commis-
4 Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment
Company Act Release No. IC-24816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734 (Jan. 16, 2001) [herein-
after Release No. IC-24816].
5 SEC, EXEMPTIVE RULE AMENDMENTS OF 2004: THE INDEPENDENT CHAIR
CONDITION, A REPORT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIA-
TIONS ACT (Apr. 2005), available at 2005 SEC LEXIS 1031.
6 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (West 1997 &
Supp. 2007). The managers of the securities portfolios of mutual funds and other
investment companies are investment advisers under the Investment Advisers
Act and subject to that Act. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 80b-2(a)(l 1), -3(a) (West 1997 &
Supp. 2007). In addition, the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act ap-
ply to mutual funds because the funds issue securities that are offered and sold
to investors. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24 (2000); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77z-3 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78mm (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000).
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sion for limiting the fraction of board seats held by interested di-
rectors. I then review quantitative social science research to ascer-
tain whether this rationale, which presently appears to be unques-
tioned,8 has factual support. If the rationale for such regulatory
requirements is not empirically justified, a different raison d'etre
must exist for designating certain directors as "interested" and cur-
tailing their allotment of seats on fund boards. The concepts and
doctrines of law that prevail in a society are not fortuitous; rather,
concepts and doctrines are adopted by the institution of law be-
cause they facilitate the operation of the society in which the law
exists, and when prevailing concepts and doctrines of law hamper
society, they are replaced.9 Therefore, if interested directors are as
likely as, or almost as likely as, independent directors to protect
investors from being exploited, regulatory measures that are based
on the "bad name" of interested directors presumably do not offer
protection to investment company shareholders but benefit society
in some other manner.
In this regard, I suggest that current measures to regulate in-
vestment company boards have largely a sociological basis and, in
particular, that they benefit society by their social productivity.
10
The social productivity of law leads me to propose a possible
8 The rationale has not been questioned even by commissioners of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission who have criticized a Commission attempt
to reduce the percentage of interested directors on investment company boards.
E.g., Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No.
IC-26520, 69 Fed. Reg. 46,378, 46,391 (Aug. 2, 2004) [hereinafter Release No.
IC-26520] (dissenting opinion of Commissioners Glassman and Atkins) (con-
tending that the statutory criteria that determine whether a director is interested
should be amended by Congress if non-interested directors are insufficiently in-
dependent).
9 Larry D. Barnett, The Roots of Law, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y &
L. 613, 615, 636-37, 672 [hereinafter The Roots of Law]; Larry D. Barnett, Law
as Symbol: Appearances in the Regulation of Investment Advisers and Attor-
neys, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 289, 290, 294-95, 302-03, 330-31 (2007) [hereinaf-
ter Law as Symbol].
1o Larry D. Barnett, Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Con-
flicts of Interest in the Investment Industry, 3 CARDOZO PUB, L., POL'Y, &
ETHICS J. 793 (2006) [hereinafter Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation
of Conflicts of Interest in the Investment Industry].
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Commission response to instances of exploitation of investment
company shareholders. The proposed response has the potential to
enhance the social productivity of law by contributing to public
trust in, and the reputation of, investment companies and by serv-
ing as a symbol that helps to bond Americans to their society. In
supplying these benefits, the approach would strengthen the social
order while avoiding the contentious matter of interested directors
versus non-interested directors and the fraction of board seats that
each type of director should hold.
II. THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND INVESTMENT COMPANY
DIRECTORS
The analysis undertaken in the instant article involves three ba-
sic concepts, viz., "investment company, .... mutual fund," and "di-
rector." The Act defines an investment company in pertinent part
as an entity that (i) issues securities to its investors and that (ii)
employs, or proposes to employ, the assets received from investors
to engage in the business of seeking profit from securities issued
by other entities." An investment company, therefore, not only is-
sues securities of its own but holds a portfolio of securities of other
issuers, and if securities are absent at either point, an investment
company does not exist under the Act.
12
While the Act specifies the nature of an investment company, it
is silent on the nature of a "mutual fund." In the securities industry,
however, a mutual fund is generally regarded as an investment
company (i) that publicly sells the securities it issues; (ii) that,
when requested by investors holding its securities, redeems these
"' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (2000).
12 See generally C. Steven Bradford, Expanding the Investment Company
Act: The SEC's Manipulation of the Definition of Security, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 995
(1999) (discussing and rejecting the position of the Securities and Exchange
Commission that the criteria determining whether instruments are securities dif-
fer between the instruments issued by an investment company to its investors
and the instruments in the portfolio of the investment company).
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securities; 13 and (iii) that manages the securities in its portfolio. 14
To use the nomenclature of the Act, a mutual fund is an open-end
management investment company.' 5 Accordingly, mutual funds
are one type of investment company, and while the instant article
refers frequently to mutual funds, its discussion of directors is ap-
plicable to all types of investment companies that have directors. 16
Indeed, mutual funds and investment companies are, in one sense,
almost coextensive because the net assets of mutual funds consti-
tute approximately 93% of the net assets of all investment compa-
nies. 1
7
The third concept requiring definition is that of "director." The
Act considers a director to be
any director of a corporation or any person performing
similar functions with respect to any organization, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, including any natural per-
son who is a member of a board of trustees of a manage-
ment company created as a common-law trust.'
8
Under the Act, therefore, a person may be a director of an entity
even though the entity is not a corporation. For example, a person
managing a limited partnership that is an investment company will
be treated by the Act as a director of the partnership if the respon-
sibilities of the person are comparable to the responsibilities of a
13 The Act defines a "redeemable security" in section 2(a)(32). 15 U.S.C. §
80a-2(a)(32) (2000).
14 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 145; JOHN DOWNES
& JORDAN E. GOODMAN, BARRON'S FINANCE & INVESTMENT HANDBOOK 442
(4th ed. 1995). This definition is also used by the Securities and Exchange
Commission. See, e.g., Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and In-
vestment Advisers, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26299, 68 Fed.
Reg. 74,714, 74,714 (Dec. 24, 2003).
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-4(3), 
-5(a) (2000).
16 Unit investment trusts, which are one of the three types of investment
companies enumerated by the Act, do not have boards of directors. 15 U.S.C. §
80a-4 (2000). For an explanation of unit investment trusts, see Thomas S. Har-
man, Emerging Alternatives to Mutual Funds: Unit Investment Trusts and Other
Fixed Portfolio Investment Vehicles, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1045 (1987).
17 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 7, 8.
18 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(12) (2000).
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director of a corporation.'
9
As indicated in Part I supra, the Act at the present time classi-
fies directors as interested or as not interested. Conventional wis-
dom in the regulation of investment companies is that independent
(i.e., not interested) directors are essential to protecting investment
company shareholders from financial exploitation. Thus, the staff
of the Commission has described independent directors as fulfill-
ing a "critical role" in preventing actions that take advantage of in-
vestment company shareholders,2 ° and one court has characterized
independent directors as performing "a vital function" in safe-
guarding the shareholders. 2'
The implication of this position is that, even though fairness is
at the heart of the fiduciary duties of all directors,22 the interested
directors of an investment company will not consistently be fair to
the shareholders of the company. The misgivings about interested
directors seem to be a result, or at least a concomitant, of the ap-
parent belief of Congress and the Commission that, because the in-
terested directors are involved in certain types of situations that are
personally important to them and/or to other persons having ties to
them, the interested directors possess an incentive to sacrifice the
goals of the shareholders when dealing with matters which impli-
cate these situations. The prevailing approach to regulating mutual
fund boards, in short, reflects a lack of confidence in interested di-
rectors.23
When is a director designated as independent? The answer re-
19 Integrated Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 2940, at *1-2 (June 1, 1979).
20 Interpretive Matters Concerning Independent Directors of Investment
Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-24083, 64 Fed. Reg.
59,877, 59,877 (Nov. 3, 1999) (statement of staff position) [hereinafter Release
No. IC-24083].
21 Papilsky v. Berndt, No. 71 Civ. 2534, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14442, at
*43 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 1976).
22 j. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty without Limits: "Independent" Directors
and the Elimination of the Duty ofLoyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 57 (2006).
23 See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 485 (1979), where the Court writes
that the welfare of shareholders was "entrusted" by Congress to the noninter-
ested directors and thus implies that Congress did not trust the interested direc-
tors to prevent the exploitation of shareholders. Id. at 485, 485 n. 15.
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quires an understanding of the detailed criteria specified by the Act
for determining the status of a director. The criteria that prevent a
director from being independent have changed since the Act be-
came law in 1940. As originally enacted, the Act prohibited an en-
tity that was required to register with the Commission as an in-
vestment company 24 from filling more than 60% of the seats on its
board of directors with persons who were an investment adviser to,
affiliated with an investment adviser to, or an officer or employee
of the investment company.25 Directors who were not in any of the
preceding categories were regarded as independent, 26 and Congress
believed that such directors were essential to representing the
shareholders of the company.27 As discussed in Part II.A below,
24 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, §§ 3, 6, 7, 54 Stat. 789, 797,
802 (1940) (codified as amended at, respectively, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (2000 &
Supp. V 2005) and 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-6, -7 (2000)). Section 3 of the Act desig-
nates the features of an investment vehicle that make the vehicle an investment
company; section 7 requires an investment company to register with the Com-
mission unless the investment company is exempt from registration under sec-
tion 6.
25 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 10(a), 54 Stat. 789, 806
(1940). A limited exception to the maximum was provided in section 10(d). If
the conditions of section 10(d) were met, all but one of the directors of a regis-
tered investment company could be affiliated with the investment adviser to the
company or could be officers or employees of the company. Id. at § 10(d), 54
Stat. at 807. The conditions creating affiliation are discussed in the text infra.
Section 10(d) was intended to cover an investment company established by an
investment adviser specifically for clients not having substantial assets available
for securities investments. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940,
S. REP. No. 76-1775, at 14 (3d sess. 1940). Section 10(d) was amended in 1970
and now allows all but one of the directors of a registered investment company
to be "interested" in the investment adviser to the company or to be officers or
employees of the company. Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970,
Pub. L. 91-547, § 5, 84 Stat. 1413, 1416 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d)
(2000)). The criterion of "interest" is discussed in Part II.A, infra, of the instant
article.
26 SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY
ACT OF 1940 AND INVESTMENT ADVISERS ACT OF 1940, S. REP. No. 76-1775, at
14 (3d sess. 1940).
27 Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F.2d 402, 406 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 934 (1977).
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Congress subsequently amended the criteria for determining the
status of a director, but the label "independent" continues to be
conferred only on directors who are free of all of the ties that trou-
bled Congress.
The reader will note both from the discussion supra and from
the discussion in Part II.A infra that the Act makes the concept of
affiliation a key factor in the status of a director. The Act considers
affiliation to exist between two persons when, inter alia, (i) at least
5% of the voting securities28 of one person 29 directly or indirectly
are owned by or can be voted by the other person; (ii) one of the
persons directly or indirectly controls or is controlled by the other
or is, along with the other person, controlled by a third person;30 or
(iii) one person is currently an "officer, director, partner, copartner,
or employee" of the other person or, if the other person is an in-
vestment company, is currently its investment adviser.3' The Act
has included the concept of affiliation since its enactment in 1940,
and notably, the definition of the concept has not changed. How-
ever, subsequent legislation altered the role of affiliation in deter-
mining whether a director is independent. This legislation is dis-
cussed next.
28 The Act currently defines a "voting security" in section 2(a)(42). 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(42) (2000). The statutory definition has not been revised since
the Act was adopted in 1940. See Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, §
2(a)(40), 54 Stat. 789, 796 (1940). For interpretations of section 2(a)(42) by the
staff of the Commission, see Real Estate Investment Trusts, SEC No-Action
Letter, 1998 SEC No-Act. Lexis 1145, at *4 (Nov. 4, 1998) (staff reply); Wells
Fargo Alternative Asset Management, LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 SEC
No-Act. Lexis 116, at *7-8 (Jan. 26, 2005) (staff reply).
29 Under the Act, a "person" is either "a natural person or a company." 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(28) (2000). The statutory definition of "person" has not
changed since the Act was adopted in 1940. See Investment Company Act of
1940, ch. 686, § 2(a)(27), 54 Stat. 789, 794 (1940).
30 The Act defines "control" in section 2(a)(9). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(9)
(2000). The statutory definition of "control" has not been altered since the Act
was adopted in 1940. See Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 2(a)(9),
54 Stat. 789, 791-92 (1940).
31 Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 2(a)(3), 54 Stat. 789, 791
(1940) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3) (2000)).
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A. Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company Act
In 1970, Congress reexamined the statutory criteria establish-
ing the status of a director and concluded that the criteria adopted
in 1940 were not furnishing sufficient protection to the sharehold-
ers of investment companies. 32 Consequently, the framework for
defining an independent director was reworked,33 and with some
modifications, the framework devised in 1970 is still in effect. As
with the original (1940) legislation, the board of a registered in-
vestment company is required by the Act to fill no less than 40%
of its seats with independent directors, but in 1970 Congress intro-
duced into the Act the concept of an "interested" person34 and thus
distinguished interested directors from independent directors.
35
The concept of the interested person, which is defined by section
2(a)(19) of the Act,36 is the foundation of the current structure of
investment company boards. Under this structure, a maximum of
60% of the directors of a registered investment company can be
"interested" in the company.37
In general terms, a person is not an independent director if she
or he is interested in the investment company either directly
through ties to the company itself or indirectly through ties to an
32 S. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-184, at 32 (1st Sess. 1969); H.
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COMPANY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970, H. REP. NO. 91-1382, at 13-14 (2d Sess. 1970).
33 Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84
Stat. 1413.
34 Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, §§
2(a), 5, 84 Stat. 1413, 1413, 1416.
35 S. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-184, at 33 (1st Sess. 1969); H.
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COMPANY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970, H. REP. No. 91-1382, at 14 (2d Sess. 1970).
36 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
31 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000). As explained in note 25 supra, section
10(d) allows more than 60% of the directors of a qualifying investment company
to be interested.
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investment adviser or principal underwriter for the company.
38
Given the congressional goal of preventing harm to the sharehold-
ers of investment companies, the ties of a person that are included
in section 2(a)(19) are evidently those believed likely to create a
significant temptation for the person to disadvantage the invest-
ment company and its shareholders in favor of (i) the person and/or
(ii) an individual or entity having ties to the person. A director will
be independent only if the director possesses none of the ties listed
by the Act; a director having any of the ties will not be independ-
ent, i.e., will be "interested." '39
The main concern of the Act, accordingly, is with conflicts of
interest 4 -situations in which an individual is pulled toward mu-
tually exclusive alternatives and is prevented, or appears to be pre-
vented, from basing decisions on the relative merits of each alter-
native for the investment company and its shareholders. If a
society is to operate effectively, however, its organizations, includ-
ing its business organizations, must avoid conflicts of interest be-
cause such conflicts, inter alia, generate distrust in and damage the
reputation of the organizations as well as make the organizations
socially dysfunctional symbols. Trust, reputation, and symbols
38 The Act defines "investment adviser" in section 2(a)(20) and "principal
underwriter" in section 2(a)(29). 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(20), -2(a)(29) (2000).
These statutory definitions have not changed since the adoption of the Act in
1940. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, §§ 2(a)(19), 2(a)(28), 54 Stat.
789, 793, 794 (1940).
39 It may be helpful to note here that the Commission has taken the position
that an individual who serves as a director of a registered investment company
can act just for herself or himself, and not as an agent or as a delegate of another
individual or an entity, except in certain situations involving a limited partner-
ship. Investment Company Act Release IC-19658, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,834, 45,836
(Aug. 31, 1993); 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a19-2(a) (2006). The position taken by the
Commission-viz., that an entity normally cannot be a director of a registered
investment company-may not have been intended by Congress. Larry D. Bar-
nett, When is a Mutual Fund Director Independent? The Unexplored Role of
Professional Relationships under Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company
Act, 4 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 155, 165 n.54 (2006) [hereinafter When is a
Mutual Fund Director Independent?].
40 See Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Investment
Company Act Release No. IC-24082, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,826, 59,827 (Nov. 3,
1999) [hereinafter Release No. IC-24082].
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seem to be fundamental aspects of every organized group, and they
41
either promote or reduce the effectiveness of the group.
Thus, in mandating that some directors of registered invest-
ment companies be non-interested persons, Congress was attempt-
ing to protect society as a whole. The responsibility of independent
directors to deal with conflicts of interest became a central tenet of
the Act in an attempt to protect shareholders from the damaging
effects of such conflicts. Independent directors, being free from
the conflicts of interest that Congress found problematic, were ex-
pected to be the shareholders' defense against financial abuse.43 In
the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress intended the inde-
pendent directors to perform "the role of 'independent watchdogs,'
who would 'furnish an independent check upon the management'
of investment companies.
44
If a person can be an independent director of an investment
company only if she or he is not "interested" in the investment
company, in an investment adviser to the company, or in a princi-
pal underwriter for the company, when is a person interested? The
statutory determinants of interest are listed in the two subsec-
tions--(A) and (B)-of section 2(a)(19) of the Act and have un-
dergone some refinement since 1970. The review below deals with
the two subsections as they are currently written.45
The statutory determinants of whether a person is an interested
director of an investment company are more easily explained by
starting with subsection (B) and subsequently considering subsec-
tion (A). Subsection (B) specifies the types of situations that make
a person interested in an investment adviser or principal under-
writer for the investment company. Subsection (A), on the other
41 Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in
the Investment Industry, supra note 10, at 814, 821, 825-27.
42 Personal Investment Activities of Investment Company Personnel and
Codes of Ethics of Investment Companies and Their Investment Advisers and
Principal Underwriters, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-21341, 60
Fed. Reg. 47,844, 47,847 (Sept. 14, 1995) ("The role of independent fund direc-
tors in policing conflicts of interest is central to the Investment Company Act.").
43 Release No. IC-24082, supra note 40, at 59,827-828.
44 Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 484 (1979) (citation omitted).
41 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
FINANCIAL PROTECTION OR SOCIAL PRODUCTIVITY? 501
hand, specifies the types of situations that make a person interested
in the investment company itself, and under subsection (A)(iii),
any person interested in an investment adviser or principal under-
writer for an investment company pursuant to subsection (B) is in-
terested in the investment company.46
In what circumstances does subsection (B) cause a person to be
interested in an investment adviser or principal underwriter for an
investment company? Such interest exists when, inter alia, the per-
son is affiliated with the investment adviser or principal under-
writer,47 has certain types of kinship ties to someone who is so af-
filiated,48 or is aware of having a direct or indirect beneficial
interest in a security that has been issued by the investment ad-
viser, by the principal underwriter, or by a party controlling either
of them.49
A person is also interested in an investment adviser or principal
underwriter when that person is, or is a partner or employee of, a
person that has served as legal counsel for the investment adviser
or principal underwriter at any time since the beginnin, of the last
two completed fiscal years of the investment company. Further, a
person is interested in an investment adviser or principal under-
writer when that person is, or is affiliated with, a person that during
the previous six months has executed securities transactions or dis-
tributed securities for, had principal transactions with, or extended
a loan to, inter alia, an investment company served by the invest-
ment adviser or principal underwriter.
51
Finally, an individual is interested in an investment adviser or
principal underwriter when the Commission has issued an order
46 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii) (2000).
47 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(i) (2000).
48 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(ii) (2000). Section 2(a)(19)(B)(ii) covers
individuals who are related as spouses, as parent and child, as siblings, as child
and spouse of a parent of the child, or as parent and spouse of a child of the par-
ent. The preceding relationships are included even if they are step or adoptive in
nature and apply to both subsection (A) and subsection (B) of section 2(a)(19).
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000).
49 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iii) (2000).
50 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iv) (2000).
"1 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(v), 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vi) (Supp. V 2005).
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designating the individual as interested because, at any time since
the start of the last two completed fiscal years of the investment
company, the individual has had "a material business or profes-
sional relationship" with the investment adviser or principal un-
derwriter or with the principal executive officer of, or a person in
control of, either the adviser or underwriter.52
While subsection (B) specifies the determinants of interest in
an investment adviser or principal underwriter for an investment
company, subsection (A) specifies the circumstances in which in-
terest exists in the investment company per se.53 The clauses of
subsection (A), in focusing on the investment company, parallel
the clauses of subsection (B) with one exception. The exception is
that, under subsection (A), interest in an investment company can-
not arise from a beneficial interest in a security issued by the com-
pany unless at least 5% of the voting securities of the company are
owned or controlled, or can be voted, by the person whose status is
in question.54 As indicated above, however, a person knowingly
holding a beneficial interest in a security that has been issued by
the investment adviser or principal underwriter for an investment
company, or by a person controlling the investment adviser or
principal underwriter, is interested in the investment company, and
any quantity of such a security suffices to make the holder inter-
ested in the company.
55
To recapitulate, the Act requires an investment company that
must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
52 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii) (Supp. V 2005).
51 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
54 Such a person would be affiliated with the investment company. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(A) (2000). A person affiliated with an investment company
through holdings or control of voting securities is interested in the company. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(i) (2000).
15 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii), 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iii) (2000). See
SAFECO Asset Management Co., SEC No-Action Letter, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 81,425, at 88,911, 88,912 (Dec. 2, 1977),
available at 1977 SEC No-Act. Lexis 2834 (SEC staff concluded that an indi-
vidual who had an indirect beneficial interest in just 0.63% of the common stock
of the entity that controlled the investment adviser and principal underwriter for
a family of investment companies would be an interested director of the invest-
ment companies).
FINANCIAL PROTECTION OR SOCIAL PRODUCTIVITY? 503
to fill at least 40% of the seats on its board with directors who do
not possess any of the interest-generating ties listed in the Act and
who, accordingly, are deemed to be independent. Because of the
importance attached to independent directors, the requirement that
40% of the directors be independent is merely a statutory mini-
mum. As discussed in Part II.B infra, the Commission, under its
congressionally delegated authority to promulgate rules,5 6 has
raised the required percentage for almost all registered investment
companies.
B. Rulemaking by the Securities and Exchange Commission
Since July 2002, mutual funds using any of ten specified rules
promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission to gain
an exemption from a mandate of the Act have been required by the
Commission to fill a majority of the seats on their boards with in-
dependent directors and to assign the responsibility for selecting
and nominating the independent directors solely to the independent
directors. 57 Because use of the rules was widespread, nine out of
ten funds were estimated to be covered by the requirement. 58 Illus-
trative of the ten rules 59 was the rule allowing a fund and specified
affiliates to engage in securities transactions with one another;60 a
fund that relies on the rule to avoid violating the ban on such trans-
actions imposed by section 17(a) of the Act6 1 must have a board
that is comprised of a majority of independent directors who are
chosen by the independent directors. The ten rules that were desig-
nated involve activities that the Commission concluded are charac-
terized by inescapable conflicts of interest between the fund and its
management.62 The Commission believed that with a majority of
seats on the board of a fund that relies on any of the rules, the in-
dependent directors would be able
56 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37(a) (2000).
57 Release No. IC-24816, supra note 4.
" Id. at 3747 n.120.
59 Id. at 3736 n.17 (identifying and summarizing the ten rules).
60 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-7 (2006).
61 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a) (2000).
62 Release No. IC-24816, supra note 4, at 3736.
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to control the fund's "corporate machinery," i.e., to elect
officers of the fund, call meetings, solicit proxies, and take
other actions without the consent of the [investment] ad-
viser... [and] have a more meaningful influence on fund
management and represent shareholders from a position of
strength.63
Did fund investors receive appreciable added protection from
the requirement that independent directors form a majority of the
membership of fund boards? The answer seems to be in the nega-
tive because "few funds," according to the Commission, had
boards whose membership was altered by the requirement. 64 None-
theless, independent directors may be helpful in protecting share-
holders. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of rigorous social science
research on whether, and the extent to which, fund shareholders
benefit from independent directors, from any particular number or
percentage of independent directors, or from a requirement that in-
dependent directors be chosen by independent directors. Indeed,
the two studies I now review are apparently the sole pertinent stud-
ies thus far completed.
In the first of these studies, tests of statistical significance indi-
cated that the financial performance of domestic-stock mutual
funds increased with the size of the board, and hence with the
number of independent directors, but was unrelated to the percent-
age of board seats held by independent directors. 65 However,
whether the relationship between the number of independent direc-
tors and fund performance was due to the status of directors under
section 2(a)(19) has been questioned,66 and whether there was an
effect that was sufficiently large to be of practical consequence is
uncertain.6 7 In the second of the studies, the financial performance
63 id.
64 Release No. IC-24082, supra note 40, at 59,830.
65 Bill Ding & Russ Wermers, Mutual Fund Performance and Governance
Structure: The Role of Portfolio Managers and Boards of Directors 22, 26, 40
(Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract--687273.
66 Alan R. Palmiter, The Mutual Fund Board: A Failed Experiment in
Regulatory Outsourcing, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 165, 200 (2006).
67 See Ding & Wermers, supra note 65, at 22 (concluding from Fama-
MacBeth regression that "board independence is not an important influence in
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of mutual funds that invested in equity securities was weakly and
inversely related to the percentage of board seats occupied by in-
dependent directors; i.e., fund performance declined to some extent
as the fraction of independent directors rose.
68
In light of the inconsistent findings of the two studies, whether
mutual fund shareholders financially benefit from independent di-
rectors is uncertain. However, even if the two studies furnished
evidence of such a benefit, neither study was available when the
Commission acted. Thus, the Commission adopted the require-
ments that independent directors constitute a majority of an in-
vestment company board and nominate the independent directors
because the requirements seemed desirable.
69
The unproven assumption that independent directors are key to
protecting mutual fund shareholders was also present in an attempt
by the Commission in 2004 to further increase the percentage of
seats on investment company boards for such directors. Under a
policy approved on a split vote of the commissioners but not yet
implemented, a fund that relies on any of the ten rules to avoid
breaching the Act would be required to place independent directors
in three out of every four seats on its board; if such a fund has a
board with just three members, at least two directors would need to
be independent.70 The proposed requirement, therefore, would
raise the percentage of independent directors from 50% to 75% for
a covered fund having four or more directors. In addition, the indi-
vidual chairing the board would need to be an independent direc-
tor.71 However, neither requirement can be implemented until the
ongoing fund performance.").
68 Felix Meschke, An Empirical Examination of Mutual Fund Boards 17-
18, 33-34, 36 (Univ. of Minnesota, Twin Cities, Carlson School of Manage-
ment, Working Paper, Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://ssm.
com/abstract=-676901. Based on tests of statistical significance, the percentage
of board positions held by independent directors was not clearly related to the
performance of funds whose portfolios consisted of debt securities. Id. at 33, 35,
37.
69 Cf Palmiter, supra note 66, at 208 ("At worst the fund board creates an
illusion of investor protection.").
70 Release No. IC-26520, supra note 8, at 46,389.
71 Id.
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Commission, pursuant to a court decision,72 receives and assesses
additional evidence on the cost of the requirements to investment
companies. The Commission has requested comments and evi-
dence pertinent to the proposed requirements 73 but has not acted on
submitted materials even though the submission period ended in
August 2006.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS
In believing that it is the independent directors of investment
companies who safeguard the shareholders of the companies from
company-related financial exploitation,74 current law assumes that
there is an unacceptable probability the interested directors (as de-
fined in section 2(a)(19) of the Act) will financially abuse the
fund's investors. The established view suggests that shareholders
will be financially injured by interested directors considerably
more often than by independent directors because interested direc-
tors are subject to inherent conflicts of interest from exposure to
situations where their goals and the goals of the shareholders dif-
fer.75 Thus, interested directors are seen as inclined to act in ways
that favor them or persons linked to them, and instances of exploi-
tation of shareholders by interested directors are thought to result
from selfishness. Financial injuries to shareholders caused by in-
dependent directors, on the other hand, are thought to result from
72 Chamber of Commerce v. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, 443 F.3d 890 (D.C.
Cir. 2006).
73 Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release
No. IC-27395, 71 Fed. Reg. 35,366 (June 19, 2006).
74 See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
75 Although its content has not been articulated with precision, the estab-
lished view probably does not assume that the interested directors of a fund act
for their own benefit in all situations where the goals of the interested directors
diverge from the goals of the fund's investors. Rather, the established view
seems to assume that interested directors act for their own benefit in a signifi-
cant and unacceptable proportion of situations that involve such divergence. See
generally Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or,
Why You Don 't Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 1 (2003) (suggesting from social and behavioral science research that
directors frequently, and perhaps typically, act for the benefit of others).
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errors in assessing the advantages and disadvantages of particular
courses of action.
Conflicts of interest admittedly exist for the interested directors
of investment companies, but should the assumption be made that
these conflicts render interested directors an actual or probable
menace to the investors in the companies? State law has a clearly
expressed set of fiduciary duties for directors of entities, including
investment companies, and the duties are imposed on all directors,
interested as well as independent.
Before discussing the duties of directors, the reader should note
that an investment company can be structured as a corporation, as a
76business trust, or as a limited partnership. However, as explained
in Part II supra, the structure of an investment company is irrele-
vant to whether a person is a director, because under the definition
of "director" in the Act, persons are directors if their functions
"with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or unin-
corporated," are "similar" to those of a director of a corporation.
77
The definition, accordingly, is not confined to a person on the
board of a corporation but extends to a general partner of an in-
vestment company that is a limited partnership and to a trustee of
an investment company that is a business trust.78
Because Delaware is the leading U.S. jurisdiction in the field of
corporation law, 79 its view of directors is particularly instructive.
76 Mutual funds are either corporations or business trusts, and both are
common among mutual funds. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 2,
at 146; John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instru-
ment of Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 171 n.40 (1997). Investment companies
can also be limited partnerships. Executive Discount Realty Co., SEC No-
Action Letter, 1993 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 731, at *4 (April 1, 1993). The Act
defines the word "company" to cover, inter alia, corporations, trusts, and part-
nerships. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8) (2000). Consequently, all three structures
come within the definition of an investment company.
" 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(12) (2000). See supra text accompanying note 18
for the full definition.
78 Integrated Resources, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1979 WL 14861, at
*1 (June 1, 1979); Sheldon A. Jones et al., The Massachusetts Business Trust
and Registered Investment Companies, 13 DEL. J. CORP. L. 421, 435 n.91, 451
(1988).
79 David L Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability
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As the Supreme Court of Delaware makes clear in the passage
quoted below, directors are deemed to be fiduciaries. The passage
is phrased in terms of corporations, but the position it states is not
limited to directors of corporations because fiduciaries of all types
and in all settings are subject to similar requirements of law: 80
The fiduciary nature of a corporate office is immutable. As
this Court stated long ago:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use
their position of trust and confidence to further their
private interests. While technically not trustees, they
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its
shareholders ....
Thus, directors are required to demonstrate both their ut-
most good faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness
of transactions in which they possess a financial, business
or other personal interest which does not devolve upon the
corporation or all stockholders generally.
8 1
Pursuant to this doctrine, the failure of a director to fulfill a fiduci-
ary duty renders the offending director liable for damages that stem
from the failure. 82 However, while the potential for liability is as-
sumed to shape the conduct of directors for the benefit of the pub-
lic, the fact that the duties apply to interested directors seems to be
overlooked.
The duties of interested directors that are expressed in doc-
trines of law may be simply words, of course, and have no influ-
ence on the behavior of directors. After all, the human capacity for
selfishness and shortsightedness should never be underestimated,
and directors may pursue their own, immediate goals regardless of
principles embodied in law. From a macrosociological perspective,
Company: How Should Courts and Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing
the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for the Limited Li-
ability Company?, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 427, 472 n.252 (1998).
80 Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REv. 795, 795, 797, 804, 818
(1983).
81 Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del.
1989) (internal citations omitted).
82 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW 301 (2000).
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however, doctrines of law as widespread and prominent as the fi-
duciary duties of directors exist because they reflect the character
of the society in which the law is embedded and endorse behav-
ioral patterns valued or needed by the system.83 Consequently, di-
rectors' fiduciary duties in state law are important-though they
may be important in ways that are not widely understood and ac-
knowledged.
With this background, I review the fiduciary duties of direc-
tors, and given the topic of the instant article, I do so in the context
of investment companies. The review begins with the duty of care
and then considers the duty of loyalty, both of which are well-
entrenched and widely accepted in state law for a director of a cor-
poration 84 and for a director (general partner) of a limited partner-
ship.85 Following the discussion of the duty of care and of loyalty,
I consider the requirement contained in state law that the directors
of an entity act in good faith. Good faith is taken up separately be-
cause, as explained in Part III.B infra, uncertainty currently exists
as to whether good faith will achieve the status of a fiduciary duty
and, if it does, what its content will be.
While corporations and limited partnerships are traditional (or
at least popular) arenas for examining director duties, business
trusts appear not to be. Thus, business trusts and the duties of their
directors (i.e., trustees) merit comment here. For mutual funds, the
law on business trusts of two states-Delaware and Massachu-
setts-is of primary importance because mutual funds that operate
as business trusts seem normally to be established under the law of
one of these states.86 In states that have decided the issue, the di-
83 The Roots of Law, supra note 9, at 615-26.
84 GEVURTZ, supra note 82, at 273-86.
85 UNIF. P'SHip ACT § 404, 6 U.L.A. 143 (2001); REV. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP
ACT § 403(a), 6A U.L.A. 365 (2003). See also Boxer v. Husky Oil Co., 429
A.2d 995, 997 (Del. Ch. 1981) ("When the provisions of the Uniform Partner-
ship Act and the Uniform Limited Partnership Act are read together, it is clear
that the general partner in a limited partnership owes a fiduciary duty to the lim-
ited partners."); accord, In re Fid. Am. Fin. Corp., 43 B.R. 74, 77 n.7 (E.D. Pa.
1984).
86 Jeffrey J. Haas & Steven R. Howard, The Heartland Funds'Receivership
and its Implications for Independent Mutual Fund Directors, 51 EMORY L.J.
153, 200 n.232 (2002). However, no count is evidently available on the number
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rectors of a business trust are generally deemed to have a fiduciary
relationship to the holders of beneficial interests in the trust.87 The
fiduciary relationship includes both a duty of care and a duty of
loyalty. 88 The Delaware statute on business trusts, however, allows
the document that governs a business trust to alter or remove fidu-
ciary duties of a trustee, although the document cannot "eliminate
the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing." 89
The current wording of the section became effective on August 1,
2006,90 but even in the absence of the legislative prohibition on
removing the obligations of good faith and fair dealing, it was
unlikely that Delaware courts would allow a trustee of a business
trust to escape these obligations. 91 In Delaware, then, a trustee of a
business trust is subject to the requirements-good faith and fair-
ness-that are inherent in and central to the role of director. 92
In short, the obligations of care and loyalty are applicable to
the directors of every investment company having a board of direc-
tors regardless of whether the company is structured as a corpora-
tion, a limited partnership, or a business trust.93 In examining each
of investment company business trusts that have been created in each state.
" Herbert B. Chermside, Jr., Annotation, Modern Status of the Massachu-
setts or Business Trust, 88 A.L.R.3d 704, 753 (1978); William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
Tapping the Reservoir: Mutual Fund Litigation Under Section 36(a) of the In-
vestment Company Act of 1940, 54 KAN. L. REV. 251, 274 (2005) ("[S]tate
courts have generally analogized the duties of trustees of business trusts to those
of directors of corporations.").
88 Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships,
54 AM. U. L. REV. 75, 80 (2004); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d
345, 367 (Del. 1993).
89 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3806(c) (LEXIS through 2006 Sess.).
90 75 Del. Laws 418 (2006), available at http://legis.delaware.gov (using
Bill Search to locate session law, select GA 143 from Session menu, select HB
from Bill Type menu, and enter 445 for No.).
91 Tamar Frankel, The Delaware Business Trust Act Failure as the New
Corporate Law, 23 CARDoZO L. REV. 325, 332 (2001).
92 The Supreme Court of Delaware acknowledges that these requirements
are fundamental to the role of a director of a corporation. See text accompanying
note 81 supra. See also Brown, supra note 22, at 57 ("The sine qua non of a di-
rector's fiduciary duty is fairness.").
93 Section 36(a) of the Act authorizes the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission to ask a federal court to impose injunctive and/or other relief on, inter
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duty, accordingly, the three structures need not be distinguished,
and as used in this article, the terms "investment company" and
"fund" will encompass all of them.
A. Duty of Care and Duty of Loyalty
We begin with the content of the fiduciary duties of care and of
loyalty. Although the two duties overlap and are thus not fully
separable, 94 they can be distinguished as concepts95 in terms of the
type of conduct expected of a fiduciary. Specifically, the duty of
care mandates reasonable caution and foresight by a fiduciary in
handling the affairs of the entity to which, or the individual to
whom, the duty is owed; the duty of loyalty, on the other hand,
forbids a purposeful action by a fiduciary in the context of a con-
flict of interest that advantages the fiduciary and disadvantages the
person owed the duty. 96 In the words of one court:
The duty of loyalty.. . is rooted in intentional tort law.
Thus, this aspect of fiduciary duty is commonly expressed
in the form of a prohibitive rule. In short, a fiduciary...
must not abuse his position of trust in order to advance his
own selfish interests. On the other hand, the duty of due
care is rooted in negligence principles, and is commonly
expressed affirmatively. The fiduciary, therefore, must ex-
alia, a director of a registered investment company for violating a "fiduciary
duty involving personal misconduct." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a) (2000). Because it
does not distinguish investment companies by their structure, the section applies
to all investment companies that have a board of directors. However, according
to recent court decisions, the section furnishes only the Commission, and not in-
vestment company shareholders, with a cause of action. E.g., Forsythe v. Sun
Life Fin., Inc., 417 F. Supp. 2d 100, 107 (D. Mass. 2006); Hamilton v. Allen,
396 F. Supp. 2d 545, 555 (E.D. Pa. 2005); Jacobs v. Bremner, 378 F. Supp. 2d
861, 866 (N.D. Ill. 2005). Moreover, section 36(a) may cover just the duty of
loyalty of investment company directors. See Jacobs, 378 F. Supp. at 866.
94 Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545,
1549 (S.D. Fla. 1993); Omnibank of Mantee v. United S. Bank, 607 So. 2d 76,
84 (Miss. 1992).
95 Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DuKE L.J. 1, 40 (2005).
96 Id.; In re Chavez, 140 B.R. 413, 424 (W.D. Tex. 1992).
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ercise at least that degree of care that a reasonably prudent
person would devote to his own affairs under like circum-
stances.
9 7
To understand more fully the two duties, it is helpful to identify
what the directors of an entity do in their role as directors. At least
three functions are expected to be performed by a director of an en-
tity. Specifically, a director is expected to (i) monitor the affairs of
the entity, (ii) inquire into entity-related matters about which the
director receives information that suggests a major problem exists
in the entity, and (iii) make decisions for the entity.98 In carrying
out each of these functions, directors are subject both to a duty of
care and to a duty of loyalty.
For investment company directors, the chief functions appear
to be the first and third,99 and because both functions implicate the
97 Wright v. Nimmons, 641 F. Supp. 1391, 1402 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
98 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and Offi-
cers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 951-52, 956, 958-59 (1990). The functions of di-
rectors of a corporation-the focus of Professor Eisenberg's article-are also the
functions of persons qualifying as directors of an investment company that is a
business trust or a limited partnership. As explained in note 76 supra, invest-
ment companies that are mutual funds are established as business trusts if they
are not established as corporations, and investment companies can also take the
form of limited partnerships.
Directors of a non-corporate investment company necessarily carry out the
third function listed in the text (i.e., decision-making for the entity) because the
function inheres in their role as directors. In addition, the first two functions of
directors are embedded in the supervisory responsibilities of the directors of in-
vestment companies. As the Securities and Exchange Commission has pointed
out, "[d]irectors are generally responsible under state law for the oversight of all
of the operations of a mutual fund, and the Investment Company Act assigns
many specific responsibilities to fund boards." Release No. IC-26520, supra
note 8, at 46,379 n.8. Because mutual funds can be business trusts, the Commis-
sion's statement applies to the directors (i.e., trustees) of funds formed as busi-
ness trusts. The statement also applies to the directors (i.e., general partners) of
investment companies that are limited partnerships. See UNIF. P'SHIP ACT §
401(f), 6 U.L.A. 133 (2001); REV. UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 403(a), 6A U.L.A.
365 (2003).
99 See Release No. IC-26520, supra note 8, at 46,379 n.8. The second func-
tion occurs just sporadically in the typical company. Eisenberg, supra note 98, at
956. Because the second function is presumably infrequent in investment com-
panies as well, it is not discussed further.
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business judgment rule, the rule must be satisfied by directors
when performing these functions. In terms of the first function, the
requirements of the business judgment rule must be met when di-
rectors decide whether an activity in their organization will be
monitored. If the directors decide to monitor the activity, they must
also satisfy the rule in selecting the manner in which the activity
will be monitored. 00 In terms of the third function, directors must
meet the requirements of the rule with regard to the procedure they
follow in reaching decisions for the entity but not necessarily with
regard to the substance of the decisions. 101
The business judgment rule is thus a centerpiece of law rele-
vant to both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty of directors.
When directors have satisfied the rule, they have not breached ei-
ther duty. 0 2 But what is the rule? One major text on corporation
law contends that a single business judgment rule does not exist.10 3
The unease that exists with the rule is illustrated by three current or
former members of the Delaware judiciary who, in a law review
100 Eisenberg, supra note 98, at 955-56. If directors do not monitor a par-
ticular activity because they have inadvertently overlooked it, their mistake must
have been reasonable under the circumstances in which it occurred. GEVURTZ,
supra note 82, at 274-78. But see In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Derivative Litig.,
698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996) (requiring directors to act in good faith in
selecting a system to detect and disclose problems in the organization).
101 GEVURTZ, supra note 82, at 286-88; In re Caremark Int'l, Inc. Deriva-
tive Litig., 698 A.2d at 967-68.
102 Stephen Fraidin & Radu Lelutiu, Strategic Alliances and Corporate
Control, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 865, 890-91 (2003); Cede & Co. v. Techni-
color, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368 (Del. 1993) (The business judgment rule "is
premised on a presumption that the directors have severally met their duties of
loyalty.., and that the directors have collectively, as a board, met their duty of
care."). See also Dennis J. Block et al., The Duty of Loyalty and the Evolution of
the Scope of Judicial Review, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 65, 67 (1993) (contending that
the duties of care and loyalty create a standard of conduct for directors and de-
scribing the business judgment rule as "a specific application of this directorial
standard of conduct").
103 GEVURTZ, supra note 82, at 279. See also John H. Matheson & Brent A.
Olson, Shareholder Rights and Legislative Wrongs: Toward Balanced Takeover
Legislation, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1425, 1488 (1991) (describing the business
judgment rule as "amorphous" and plagued by "vagueness and various manifes-
tations").
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article, wrote:
[A] standard formulation of the business judgment rule in
Delaware is that it creates a presumption that (i) a decision
was made by directors who (ii) were disinterested and in-
dependent, (iii) acted in subjective good faith, and (iv) em-
ployed a reasonable decision making process.'
0 4
At the same time, however, the authors contend that the rule as
formulated is not employed by Delaware courts to evaluate the in-
herent merits of a board action as the basis for determining
whether the action breached the directors' duty of care and/or duty
of loyalty. Instead, according to the authors, the rule as stated es-
tablishes a presumption that places on plaintiffs the burden of
proof. 0 5 The determinations of a court that matter with respect to
the business judgment rule, the authors argue, concern whether the
requirements specified in their description of the rule have been
met, and the substance of the board decision is irrelevant to the
outcome of the judicial process.' °6 In essence, then, the rule identi-
fies the circumstances in which the directors of an entity escape li-
ability for a loss arising from an action they approved, but the mer-
its of the board decision are not involved in the burden-shifting
presumption of the rule.
If any element of the business judgment rule is not satisfied
when the directors of an entity make a decision-e.g., if the direc-
tors participating in the decision were subject to a conflict of inter-
est or were acting in bad faith-the rule will be unavailable to the
directors as a defense. In this event, the directors responsible for
the decision will be liable for losses sustained by the entity they
'04 William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Stan-
dards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1298
(2001).
105 See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1987) (ex-
plaining that presumptions can function to impose the burden of proof on one
party and stem from "considerations of fairness, public policy, and probability,
as well as judicial economy").
106 Allen et al., supra note 104, at 1297; William T. Allen et al., Realigning
the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A
Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Problem, 96
Nw. U. L. REV. 449, 457 (2002).
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serve unless they are able to establish that the decision, and the
procedure employed to reach it, were fair to the entity.' °7 The latter
standard, in requiring directors to prove both the substantive fair-
ness and the procedural fairness of the decision to avoid liability, is
more demanding than the business judgment rule.' 08
B. Good Faith
In addition to a duty of care and a duty of loyalty, courts may
have also started to recognize in the director role a duty to act in
good faith. 109 Whether good faith will be accepted in U.S. law as a
fiduciary duty is uncertain, and because a common-law fiduciary
duty of good faith is only in the process of emerging-if it emerges
at all-its content is yet to be determined." 0 However, the mean-
ing of the phrase "good faith" in law applicable to directors will be
consistent with the meaning of the phrase to the public generally
because the concepts and doctrines of law arise from, and are
107 Block et al., supra note 102, at 69; Bud Roth, Entire Fairness Review
for a "Pure" Breach of the Duty of Care: Sensible Approach or Technicolor
Flop, 3 DEL. L. REv. 145, 165-67 (2000).
108 Lyman P. Q. Johnson, The Audit Committee's Ethical and Legal Re-
sponsibilities: The State Law Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REv. 27, 46 (2005).
109 Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4, 74 (2006). A portion of a June 2006 opinion of the Su-
preme Court of Delaware is consistent with the contention of Professor
Eisenberg that a duty of good faith is being recognized. In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (en banc). On the one hand, the court
reasoned that "[a] vehicle is needed to address ... doctrinally" situations in
which the duties of care and loyalty have not been breached by a director, and
this "doctrinal vehicle is the duty to act in good faith." Id. at 66. On the other
hand, the court also stated that it was not deciding whether "good faith is a duty
that, like the duties of care and loyalty, can serve as an independent basis for
imposing liability upon corporate officers and directors." Id. at 67 n. 112. In No-
vember 2006, the Supreme Court of Delaware adopted a position that is incon-
sistent with the contention of Professor Eisenberg. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d
362, 369-70 (Del. 2006), which is discussed infra in the text accompanying
notes 115 and 116.
110 In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d at 63-64 (en banc)
(describing a duty of good faith as "not a well-developed area of our corporate
fiduciary law" and "up to this point relatively uncharted").
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molded by, the society in which law operates."1 ' Notably, the Ox-
ford English Dictionary defines "good faith" to include "fidel-
ity... [in] fulfilling one's trust." '112 Thus, the obligation of good
faith for directors that is manifested in law can be expected to en-
tail, in large part, conduct that preserves and promotes trust in in-
terpersonal relationships. By doing so, law will express the vital
role of trust in promoting the effective operation of a society."
3
A macrosociological treatment of the institution of law ap-
proaches the doctrines (as well as the concepts) of the institution as
mechanisms that in the long run facilitate, rather than undermine,
the functioning of society. If this perspective is useful for under-
standing the institution, the doctrines and concepts of law will ul-
timately embody the requisites for effective group operation. Ac-
cordingly, an emphasis on interpersonal trust in the obligation of
good faith may be attributable to, and a means of rectifying, an
erosion or abandonment of such an emphasis in the duty of loy-
alty," 4 and it may not be coincidence that the Supreme Court of
Delaware has subsumed good faith under the duty of loyalty.1 15
Specifically, the Supreme Court of Delaware has taken the po-
sition that bad faith is necessary, though not sufficient, to render
directors liable for losses resulting from action or inaction by them
as directors and that, because liability for bad faith stems from a
1ll The Roots of Law, supra note 9, at 615-26, 677-80.
112 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 679 (2d ed. 1989) (definitions 10 and
11.a. of "faith"). Accord, RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 822 (2d ed. unabr. 1987) (definition of "good faith").
113 Stephen Knack, Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evi-
dence from the States, 46 AM. J. POL. Sci. 772, 779 (2002) (finding that the per-
formance of state government rises with the level of trust characterizing state
populations); Daniel Lederman et al., Violent Crime: Does Social Capital Mat-
ter?, 50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 509, 529 (2002); additional support-
ing empirical studies are summarized and cited in Social Productivity, Law, and
the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in the Investment Industry, supra note 10,
at 827.
114 Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE
L.J. 425 (1993).
115 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006). In so ruling, the
court regarded good faith not as a fiduciary duty but, rather, as an element of a
fiduciary duty, viz., the duty of loyalty.
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breach of the duty of loyalty, good faith is inherent in loyalty.
1 16
Thus, the court, in endorsing the fiduciary duty of loyalty, rein-
forced for directors an obligation (albeit not a fiduciary duty) of
good faith. Notably, by placing good faith within the duty of loy-
alty, the court directed attention to the ties that individuals have to
one another and, hence, to pertinent groups, and it implicitly ac-
knowledged that the ability of groups to operate successfully de-
pends in part on the degree to which their members are committed
to the groups. The position adopted by the court, in short, mani-
fested a principle of group dynamics." 17
If the preservation or augmentation of interpersonal trust is an
underlying concern of good faith, what substantive components
might good faith contain as a fiduciary duty or as a component of a
fiduciary duty? One scholar has suggested that the foundation of
good faith as a fiduciary duty in a business setting should be com-
prised of four elements: (i) the personal integrity needed to sustain
social life, (ii) adherence to societal norms of decency in business
operations, (iii) conformity to important standards and mandates
that have been established for business entities, and (iv) commit-
ment to fulfilling the particular office held in a business entity." 8
With these elements, good faith prohibits a director of an entity
from making decisions for the entity based on a personal non-
financial motive when the shareholders will be financially in-
jured.119 Since apart from good faith the duty of loyalty mandates
that directors not approve action or inaction by the entity that fi-
nancially harms its shareholders when the directors have a personal
financial reason for approving the action or inaction, 120 an essential
aspect of the director role is the protection of shareholders from fi-
nancial abuse. Notably, the Supreme Court of Delaware, in an en
banc opinion, has indicated that a commitment to preventing
avoidable economic harm to shareholders, as well as promoting
116 Id.
117 See The Roots of Law, supra note 9, at 615 & nn.4-5.
118 Eisenberg, supra note 109, at 5, 22-25.
19 Id. at 57-58. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (Del. 2006); Blake v. Smith,
No. 03-0003-B, 2006 Mass. Super. LEXIS 668, at *21 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006).
120 E.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REv. 247, 298-99 (1999).
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economic gain for shareholders, is encompassed by the obligation
of good faith applicable to directors of a corporation.12 1 Because
the expectations that are embodied in law for directors are essen-
tially the same in every type of investment company having a
board, 122 a director of an investment company must have a com-
mitment to the financial concerns of the company's shareholders
even if the investment company is a limited partnership or a busi-
ness trust.
C. Summary
Parts III.A and III.B of this article advanced several key points.
First, the members of an investment company board are subject to
three obligations--care, loyalty, and good faith-and at least the
first two of these obligations are fiduciary in nature, i.e., expres-
sions of a societal demand for ethical conduct in business (and
other) relationships rather than contractual provisions for specified
conduct in relationships.' 23 Second, the three obligations, which
are embedded in state law and derive from the social setting in
which the law of a state exists, cover all directors of all investment
companies. The three obligations thus apply to the interested direc-
tors of investment companies. The third point, which parallels the
second, is that the test determining whether a fiduciary duty has
been breached is the same for all directors. State law, that is, offers
no safe haven for investment company directors of a particular
stripe, and directors who are interested, as well as directors who
are not interested, under section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Com-
pany Act are treated alike by state law. Under state law, then, in-
terested directors should not differ from independent directors in
the degree to which they protect investment company shareholders
from financial abuse.
121 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66-67 (Del.
2006) (en banc).
122 See notes 84 to 88 supra and accompanying text.
123 See Robert W. Hillman, Closely-Held Firms and the Common Law of
Fiduciary Duty: What Explains the Enduring Qualities of a Punctilio?, 41
TULSA L. REV. 441, 442, 448-49 (2006).
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D. In re Nuveen Fund Litigation
In a case that illustrates the duties of investment company di-
rectors, the directors of two closed-end funds 124 were alleged to
have breached their duty of care in approving the issuance and sale
of additional shares by each fund after the initial blocks of shares
offered by the funds had been purchased by investors.12 5 As a pre-
sumably conventional closed-end investment company, each fund
would have sold its shares to the public but would not have re-
deemed these shares at the request of their owners.126 Investors
who, after purchasing shares of either fund, wanted to dispose of
the shares would have sold them to other persons who desired to
acquire the shares as an investment. Following the initial sale of
shares by the fund, then, transactions in fund shares would have
occurred between investors. However, the market price of the
shares in such transactions frequently differs from the net asset
value of the shares, 127 although the market price and the net asset
124 Under the Act, a closed-end fund is a management investment company
that issues securities that are not redeemable by the company. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
2(a)(32),-5(a)(2) (2000).
125 In re Nuveen Fund Litigation, No. 94 C 360, slip op., 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19482 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 21, 1995) (report of magistrate judge) [hereinafter
Report of Magistrate Judge]; In re Nuveen Fund Litigation, No. 94 C 360, slip
op., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8077 (N.D. Ill., May 17, 1996) (district court opin-
ion) [hereinafter District Court Opinion].
126 See Report of Magistrate Judge, supra note 125, at *7; District Court
Opinion, supra note 125, at *4. Closed-end funds that satisfy specified condi-
tions can periodically redeem shares they have issued. 17 C.F.R. § 270.23c-3
(2006). See generally Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Exemptive Rule Amendments of
2004: The Independent Chair Condition, A Report in Accordance with the Con-
solidated Appropriations Act, 2005, 2005 SEC LEXIS 1031 (April 2005), at
*65-67 (discussing Rule 23c-3). I assume that the two funds did not take advan-
tage of Rule 23c-3 and regularly redeem their shares, because neither the Report
of the Magistrate Judge nor the District Court Opinion mentions the Rule.
127 See DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 14, at 233 (defining "closed-end
fund" and "closed-end management company"). The "net asset value" of a share
is computed by subtracting the total liabilities of a fund from the total market
value of the assets of the fund, including the securities in its portfolio, and divid-
ing the result by the number of outstanding shares of the fund. Id. at 449-50 (de-
fining "net asset value").
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value of shares of closed-end funds tend to move in the same direc-
tion and movements in the former are on average smaller than
movements in the latter.'
28
In the instant litigation, the complaint alleged that, because
each fund invested only in bonds and the additional shares of the
fund were sold when interest rates were low, the directors breached
their duty of care in failing to anticipate that the bonds acquired by
the funds with the proceeds from the sale of the additional shares
would unavoidably damage the long-term investment performance
of each fund. 129 The reason for this damage, the plaintiffs claimed,
was that the market price of the newly acquired bonds would de-
cline in the future when interest rates increased and the decline
would reduce the net asset value of fund shares. 130 The complaint
also alleged that the directors did not fulfill their duty of care be-
cause they failed to understand that, in violation of the funds' arti-
cles of incorporation, the additional shares were priced to sell at
less than the net asset value of shares presently outstanding, which
caused investors who owned shares just prior to the sale of the ad-
ditional shares to suffer a financial loss. 13 1 Finally, the complaint
alleged that at least two of the directors approving the sale of the
additional shares were motivated by self-interest stemming from
ties they had to the investment adviser and the parent of the ad-
viser. 132The self-interest existed, according to the complaint, be-
cause the proceeds from the sale of the additional shares would in-
crease the assets of the funds and thereby result in the payment by
the funds of larger advisory fees to the adviser. 33 In effect, there-
fore, the plaintiffs contended that the two directors had also
128 Peter Klibanoff et al., Investor Reaction to Salient News in Closed-End
Country Funds, 53 J. FIN. 673, 678, 681 (1998) (finding that, for 39 single-
country closed-end funds during the period January 1986 through March 1994,
weekly changes in share price were 36% less than weekly changes in net asset
value).
129 Report of Magistrate Judge, supra note 125, at * 13-14.
130 Id.
131 Id. at *10-11, *13; District Court Opinion, supra note 125, at *6-7.
132 Report of Magistrate Judge, supra note 125, at * 16.
133 Id. at *2, *4, *9-10.
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breached their duty of loyalty to the funds.' 
34
With regard to the fund boards, each fund had seven directors,
and the individuals who were the directors of one fund were also
the directors of the other fund. 135 All seven directors of each fund
were named as defendants, and two of the seven had the status of
interested directors under section 2(a)(19) of the Act.'36
The decision of the federal district court resulted from a motion
to dismiss filed by the five directors who were designated by the
funds as independent.' 37 Employing the business judgment rule, 138
the court focused on whether the independent directors, by relying
entirely on materials supplied by the funds' investment adviser and
its parent, had utilized a reasonable procedure in evaluating the ef-
fect that the additional shares would have on the future investment
performance of the funds. 139 In doing so, the court followed the
view of the business judgment rule presented in Part III.A supra.
However, this view may not have been followed in considering the
allegation that the articles of incorporation of the funds were
breached by the price that the board set for the additional shares.
On this issue, the court's opinion is not altogether clear, and even
134 See Strougo v. Scudder, Stevens & Clark, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 783, 800
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (concluding on facts similar to those of Nuveen that plaintiffs
had alleged a violation by fund directors of their duty of loyalty to the fund be-
cause plaintiffs claimed the directors had a financial incentive to favor the in-
vestment adviser to the fund).
135 Report of Magistrate Judge, supra note 125, at *3-4.
136 Id. at *4. The two directors were interested directors of the funds be-
cause they were interested persons of the investment adviser to the funds. 15
U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii) (2000). Two factors made these directors inter-
ested persons of the adviser, although either factor by itself would have sufficed.
First, each of the two directors was a director of the adviser. Report of Magis-
trate Judge, supra note 125, at *3. As directors of the adviser, they were affili-
ated with the adviser, and this affiliation caused them to be interested in the ad-
viser. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(3)(D), -2(a)(19)(B)(i) (2000). Second, both
directors owned stock issued by the corporation that was the parent of the ad-
viser and that controlled the adviser. Report of Magistrate Judge, supra note
125, at *3-4. An owner of a security issued by an entity in control of an invest-
ment adviser is interested in the adviser. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iii) (2000).
13' District Court Opinion, supra note 125, at * 1.
138 Id. at * 12.
139 Id. at *13-22.
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though the directors claimed they had relied on counsel from an
outside law firm, the court may have believed that the merits of the
board's decision were pertinent.
40
Two matters that were not discussed in the opinion of the court
are noteworthy. First, all seven directors of the funds had evidently
voted to approve the issuance and sale of the additional shares, and
the plaintiffs had alleged that two of the directors were interested
persons under section 2(a)(19) due to their ties to the investment
adviser and its controlling parent.14' However, the motion to dis-
miss had been filed by the five directors who were independent
under section 2(a)(19), not by the two directors who were inter-
ested, and the court opinion thus does not analyze the law applica-
ble to the two interested directors and their votes. Such an analysis
would have been instructive.
A second and equally important question omitted by the court
was whether any of the fund directors who were denominated as
independent had a conflict of interest pertinent to the business
judgment rule. Such a conflict of interest would have raised the is-
sue of whether the affected director fulfilled his/her obligations
under state law. In particular, one director who was evidently clas-
sified by the funds as independent pursuant to section 2(a)(19) 142
could have been incorrectly classified due to subsection (B)(vii).143
140 See id. at *24 (concluding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the
directors, in relying on counsel, had not fulfilled their duty of care).
141 See supra note 136.
142 The district court described the fund director in question as independent,
and the plaintiffs evidently did not contest this designation. District Court Opin-
ion, supra note 125, at *1, *8.
The fund director in question had been chairman of the investment adviser
to the funds. Report of Magistrate Judge, supra note 125, at *4. The position of
chairperson is not described. If, as chairman, the fund director was a director
and/or officer of the adviser, he would have been affiliated with the adviser, and
hence interested in the adviser and the funds, but only while he was a direc-
tor/officer of the adviser. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(3)(D), 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii), 80a-
2(a)(19)(B)(i) (2000).
143 Subsection (B)(vii) provides that interest in the investment adviser or
principal underwriter for an investment company exists on the part of "any natu-
ral person whom the Commission by order shall have determined to be an inter-
ested person by reason of having had at any time since the beginning of the last
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At some point in the past, the fund director in question had been
chairman of the parent (and hence the entity in control) of the
funds' investment adviser, 44 and if he had held this position at any
time since the start of the most recent two completed fiscal years of
the funds, he might have been found under subsection (B)(vii) to
be currently involved in a "material business or professional rela-
tionship" with the parent. 145 Such a relationship would be deemed
to exist in the present even though the fund director was no longer
chairman of the parent, and it would make the director interested in
the investment adviser because subsection (B)(vii) covers a person
(e.g., a parent) that controls the adviser. If the director was still in-
terested in the adviser, he would be an interested director of the
funds. 146
two completed fiscal years of such investment company a material business or
professional relationship with such investment adviser or principal underwriter
or with the principal executive officer or any controlling person of such invest-
ment adviser or principal underwriter." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii) (Supp.
V 2005). See generally When is a Mutual Fund Director Independent?, supra
note 39, at 165-78 (distinguishing "professional" relationships from "business"
relationships and discussing the former under subsections (A)(vii) and (B)(vii)
of section 2(a)(19)). A ruling by the Commission that a director is interested in
the investment adviser or principal underwriter for an investment company un-
der subsection (B)(vii), or is interested in the investment company under subsec-
tion (A)(vii) (infra note 151), does not operate retroactively; the director is
deemed to be interested only after the ruling. S. COMM. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No.
91-184, at 33 (1st Sess. 1969); H. COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COMPANY AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970, H. REP. No.
91-1382, at 14 (2d Sess. 1970).
144 Report of Magistrate Judge, supra note 125, at *3, *4.
145 A seven-member board can have a maximum of four interested directors
under section 10(a) of the Act (7 x 0.60 = 4.2). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000).
Even though two of the seven directors of the Nuveen funds were interested (see
supra note 136 and accompanying text), an additional board member of each
Nuveen fund could have been an interested director without placing the boards
in violation of section 10(a). Compliance with section 10(a), however, has no
bearing on whether a director has breached a fiduciary duty under state law.
146 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii), 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(vii) (2000 & Supp.
V 2005). Subsection (A)(iii) deems a member of the board of directors of an in-
vestment company to be interested in the company if the director is "any inter-
ested person of any investment adviser of or principal underwriter for such com-
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When does a position that is no longer held create an ongoing
material business or professional relationship? If the position was
occupied during the time period covered by subsection (B)(vii), a
material business or professional relationship will exist if the posi-
tion could
impair a director's independence by providing incentives
for the director to place his or her own interests over the in-
terests of fund shareholders. The key factors in evaluating
whether a director's position with [an entity specified by
the subsection] would tend to impair his or her independ-
ence include the level of the director's responsibility in the
position and the level of compensation or other benefits
that the director receives or received from the position. 14
7
Given the above test for whether a relationship is material, in
what situations would a director of the funds who was formerly
chairperson of the parent of the investment adviser to the funds
have a current material business relationship with the parent and,
hence, a current conflict of interest? Otherwise expressed, what
circumstances would provide the director, as former chairperson of
the parent, with a continuing incentive to place the welfare of the
parent and adviser ahead of the welfare of the funds? A number of
possibilities can be imagined. For example, a current material
business relationship would presumably exist if there was more
than a negligible possibility that, at the time the board authorized
the funds to issue and sell additional shares, the parent would
award its former chairperson a lucrative consulting contract or
would steer clients to a business managed by its former chairper-
son. 148 These examples, although hypothetical, are plausible be-
cause the parent in the instant case was not a small entity but a
"multi-million dollar" firm supplying financial services as an in-
vestment banker and investment adviser. 1
49
pany." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iii) (2000).
147 Release No. IC-24083, supra note 20, at 59,879.
148 Id. at 59,880-81. If an individual chaired the parent of the investment
adviser at the time he or she voted as a fund director to approve an action by the
fund, the position as chair of the parent could by itself have produced a material
business relationship with the investment adviser. Id. at 59,880.
149 District Court Opinion, supra note 125, at *3-4.
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E. Director Status under Section 2(a)(19) and Director
Liability for Board Decisions
The test quoted above1 50 for whether a business or professional
relationship is material was articulated by the staff of the Securities
and Exchange Commission for two provisions of section 2(a)(19)
of the Act-namely, subsections (A)(vii) and (B)(vii)l'5 '-but it
has an important feature in common with the business judgment
rule: Under the subsections and under the rule, evaluations of in-
vestment company directors are based on specifics.' 52 Generalities
such as category labels, accordingly, do not determine the outcome
of these evaluations. In terms of the business judgment rule, an in-
vestment company director who participated in a particular deci-
sion and who had a conflict of interest or was acting in bad faith
with regard to the matter that was decided would be liable under
state law for a loss resulting from the decision unless the decision
was fair.' 53 The status of the director under section 2(a)(19)-
whether the director is interested or not interested-is not relevant
50 Supra note 147 and its accompanying text.
151 Subsection (A)(vii) provides that interest in an investment company ex-
ists on the part of
any natural person whom the Commission by order shall have deter-
mined to be an interested person by reason of having had, at any time
since the beginning of the last two completed fiscal years of such com-
pany, a material business or professional relationship with such com-
pany or with the principal executive officer of such company or with
any other investment company having the same investment adviser or
principal underwriter or with the principal executive officer of such
other investment company.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(vii) (Supp. V 2005). Subsection (B)(vii) is repro-
duced in note 143 supra.
152 Release No. IC-24083, supra note 20, at 59,879 (stating the view of the
Commission staff that, under subsections (A)(vii) and (B)(vii), whether the in-
dependence of a director might be impaired by a business or professional rela-
tionship depends on "the particular facts of each case"); Cede & Co. v. Techni-
color, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (asserting that the business judgment
rule applies to "the business transaction at hand" and "a particular transaction").
153 See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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to liability. However, a conflict of interest that was created for the
director by the matter decided is relevant, whether or not the con-
flict affected the status of the director under the Act.
To illustrate, section 2(a)(19) provides that a director of an in-
vestment company is not interested in the company if, inter alia,
the director has not served as an attorney for the company or its in-
vestment adviser at any time since the start of the previous two
completed fiscal years of the company and is not a member of a
law firm any of whose partners or employees have done so.1
54
Nonetheless, a director who is not interested under this provision
would be unable to impartially assess a given matter if the direc-
tor's spouse would obtain a significant financial benefit from the
decision on the matter by the board of the company. Within the
scope of state law, then, a fund director would have a conflict of
interest regarding a board decision if a current or former position
or relationship leads the director to anticipate personal gain from
board approval or disapproval of an action by the fund and thus
"tend[ed] to impair"'5 5 the director's judgment on behalf of the
fund with respect to the matter. In this situation, the director could
not rely on the business judgment rule as a defense because the
rule does not shield from liability a director who promotes a board
decision with knowledge that he or she will obtain a unique finan-
154 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(19)(A)(iv), 80a-2(a)(19)(B)(iv) (2000).
155 According to the reports of the Senate and House committees that
drafted section 2(a)(19), Congress wanted a director of an investment company
to be deemed interested under subsections (A)(vii) and (B)(vii) when the direc-
tor had a material business or professional relationship with specified parties,
i.e., a relationship that "might tend to impair" the director's ability to represent
shareholders. S. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, INVESTMENT COMPANY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1969, S. REP. No. 91-184, at 33 (1st Sess. 1969); H.
COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, INVESTMENT COMPANY
AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1970, H. REP. No. 91-1382, at 14 (2d Sess. 1970). The
"might tend to impair" standard, however, arguably should not be confined to
subsections (A)(vii) and (B)(vii). Rather, all of the subsections of section
2(a)(19) may reflect a concern with situations and arrangements that "might tend
to impair" the ability of a director to advance the welfare of shareholders. Fur-
thermore, a plausible argument can be made that the phrase "tend to impair" is
appreciably broadened by the use of the word "might" and that Congress be-
lieved that interest should exist when a situation or arrangement produced even a
low probability of swaying a director.
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cial benefit from the decision.'
56
For a fund director then, the fiduciary duties found in state law
are unaffected by section 2(a)(19) because the Act does not pre-
empt state law on the fiduciary duties of fund directors. 5 7 Indeed,
the Commission has expressly acknowledged that the fiduciary du-
ties of investment company directors embodied in state law are
separate from, and in addition to, the mandates of the Act.158
Within the Act, nonetheless, section 2(a)(19) is important, and its
role is significant. In particular, the status of an individual estab-
lished by the section can affect the eligibility of the individual for a
seat on an investment company board,159 and this status is the basis
for assigning certain board tasks to the individuals who are direc-
tors.1
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Because under state law the liability of an investment company
director for a decision made as a director is determined by whether
the director directly or indirectly could or did benefit personally
from the decision in question, the test for interest under state law
differs from and is much broader than the activities and relation-
ships listed in section 2(a)(19) of the Act. Specifically, interest is
present under state law if any factor renders a director of an entity
incapable of making for the entity a decision that is grounded
solely on the advantages or disadvantages of the decision to the en-
tity. 161 In the words of the Supreme Court of Delaware, interest ex-
ists in a particular matter whenever a connection of a director to an
individual or an entity
is so close that the director's independence may reasonably
156 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). See Allen et al., su-
pra note 104 and accompanying text.
157 Clarke Randall, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Company Directors and
Management Companies Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 31 OKLA.
L. REV. 635, 644 (1978).
158 Release No. IC-26520, supra note 8, at 46,380, 46,392 n.32 (statement
of commissioners); Release No. IC-24083, supra note 20, at 59,878 (statement
of staff).
'59 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (2000).
160 These tasks are reviewed in Palmiter, supra note 66, at 171-76.
161 In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 920 (Del. Ch.), ap-
peal denied, 829 A.2d 141 (Del. 2003).
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be doubted. This doubt might arise either because of finan-
cial ties, familial affinity, a particularly close or intimate
personal or business affinity or because of evidence that in
the past the relationship caused the director to act non-
independently vis a vis an interested director.'
62
For investment company directors, the implication of the pre-
ceding points is of major practical significance, and it is central to
the instant article. Two investment company directors who are
similarly situated with regard to a given matter will be subject to
the same standard of review under state law for ascertaining
whether, in their action on the matter, they breached a fiduciary
duty even though one director qualifies as interested under section
2(a)(19) of the Act and the other does not. When adjudicating an
allegation of a breach of duty by a director, state law focuses on
the character of the matter being decided by the board and on
whether the director directly or indirectly gained, or was in a posi-
tion to gain, a personal advantage from the decision reached.
If the status of a director under section 2(a)(19) of the Act is ir-
relevant to the director's risk of liability under state law for deci-
sions as a director, then directors designated as interested by the
section may be no more likely than directors designated as inde-
pendent to use their board seats to benefit themselves at the ex-
pense of shareholders. Notably, social science research has often
found that regulatory law fails to achieve its goal(s). This research,
which I discuss next, buttresses the argument that directors of an
investment company make decisions for the company unaffected
by their status under section 2(a)(19).
In illustrating social science research on the impact of regula-
tory law, I begin with studies of government regulation directed at
economic activity. As to such activity, state statutes prohibiting
employment policies that either mandate union membership or
mandate abstention from union membership have been found not
to influence appreciably the proportion of nonagricultural workers
162 Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1051 (Del. 2004) (emphasis in origi-
nal). Accord, McCabe v. Foley, 424 F. Supp. 2d 1315, 1324-25 (M.D. Fla.
2006).
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who are union members.' 63 In addition, statutes and executive-
branch actions directed at controlling hospital costs have not con-
sistently and substantially done so.164 As an example of govern-
ment regulation directed at activity that is largely social in nature,
state statutes requiring minors to attend school until they reach a
specified age have generally not had a material impact on the
school enrollment rates of minors. 165 Moreover, statutes permitting
divorce only when fault exists seem to have had little effect on the
divorce rate because the adoption of statutes allowing divorce
without fault evidently has had no more than a short-term impact
on the probability of marriage dissolution 166 (even though critics of
163 Keith Lumsden & Craig Petersen, The Effect of Right-to- Work Laws on
Unionization in the United States, 83 J. POL. ECON. 1237 (1975).
164 John J. Antel et al., State Regulation and Hospital Costs, 77 REv. ECON.
& STAT. 416, 421-22 (1995).
165 JOHN K. FOLGER & CHARLES B. NAM, EDUCATION OF THE AMERICAN
POPULATION 24-27 (1967); William M. Landes & Lewis C. Solman, Compul-
sory Schooling Legislation: An Economic Analysis of Law and Social Change in
the Nineteenth Century, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 54, 86 (1972); Linda Nasif Edwards,
An Empirical Analysis of Compulsory Schooling Legislation, 1940-1960, 21
J.L. & ECON. 203, 221-22 (1978).
166 The most persuasive study supporting this conclusion is by Frans van
Poppel & Joop de Beer, Measuring the Effect of Changing Legislation on the
Frequency of Divorce: The Netherlands, 1830-1990, 30 DEMOGRAPHY 425
(1993). In the van Poppel and de Beer study, which was confined to The Nether-
lands, the divorce rate was measured by the annual number of divorces per
10,000 married males during a 160-year period (viz., 1830-1990). Id. at 430. A
no-fault divorce statute was adopted in The Netherlands in 1971. Id. at 430.
None of three major changes that occurred in divorce law during the 160 years
covered by the study, including the introduction of no-fault divorce in 1971, had
a long-term, appreciable effect on the divorce rate. Id. at 438-39.
Of the research done to date on the impact of no-fault divorce law on the
incidence of divorce, the study by van Poppel and de Beer is the most convinc-
ing for several reasons. First, the study covered a long time span during which
three important changes in divorce law occurred, and it found that the response
of the divorce rate to all three changes was the same. The impact of divorce law,
then, was consistent and exhibited a pattern. Second, the changes in law were
assessed with a statistical technique whose estimates of relationships between
variables are unaffected by serial dependency in data. Id. at 427. Divorce rates
for multiple time points can be expected to exhibit serial dependency because
the rate at any one time point is likely to be affected by the rate at the preceding
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no-fault statutes have believed the statutes substantially increase
the incidence of divorce1 67).
The preceding studies are not alone. An impressive body of
well-designed quantitative research on a variety of social problems
has found that law intended to regulate behavior, including law
that criminalizes behavior, does not have a large, enduring impact
on the frequency of the behavior.' 68 The reason for the lack of a
time point. Third, the denominator of the divorce rate calculated by van Poppel
and de Beer was the number of married males, not the total population. Id. at
430. As a result, their measure of the likelihood of divorce was limited to per-
sons who were exposed to the possibility of divorce.
Research on the impact of divorce law in the United States has yielded dis-
puted findings. E.g., compare Norval D. Glenn, Further Discussion of the Ef-
fects of No-Fault Divorce on Divorce Rates, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 800
(1999), with Joseph Lee Rodgers et al., The Effect of No-Fault Divorce Legisla-
tion on Divorce Rates: A Response to a Reconsideration, 59 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1026 (1997) and Joseph Lee Rodgers et al., Did No-Fault Divorce Legis-
lation Matter? Definitely Yes and Sometimes No, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 803
(1999). In this research, the denominator for the divorce rate seems to have uni-
formly been the total number of people in a jurisdiction, and the dependent vari-
able was, therefore, the crude divorce rate. The denominator of the crude di-
vorce rate includes not only unmarried adults but also individuals too young to
marry, and the percentage of these persons in a population can differ at one
point in time across jurisdictions and across time in a single jurisdiction. Ac-
cordingly, the crude divorce rate can vary between jurisdictions and over time
within a jurisdiction even though the risk of divorce is the same. Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, when differences and changes in statutes governing divorce are
statistically related to the crude divorce rate, jurisdiction-level differences and
changes in demographic, economic, and social attributes of the population ap-
pear to have a considerably stronger relationship to the divorce rate. Thomas B.
Marvell, Divorce Rates and the Fault Requirement, 23 LAW & SOC'Y REv. 544,
551, 557 (1989).
167 Robert M. Gordon, Note, The Limits of Limits on Divorce, 107 YALE
L.J. 1435, 1436, 1439-40 (1998).
168 E.g., Law as Symbol, supra note 9, at 300-01 nn.65-67; Anne H.
Gauthier, The Impact of Family Policies on Fertility in Industrialized Countries:
A Review of the Literature, 26 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REv. 323, 339, 342
(2007); Ann E. Horvath-Rose et al., Capping Kids: The Family Cap and Non-
marital Childbearing, 27 POPULATION RES. & POL'Y REv. 119, 134 (2008);
Marc Poitras & Daniel Sutter, Policy Ineffectiveness or Offsetting Behavior? An
Analysis of Vehicle Safety Inspections, 68 S. ECON. J. 922, 932 (2002). Law can
also have inconsistent effects on a targeted problem; that is, law may improve
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substantial, permanent impact probably lies in societal complexity.
The studies cited were conducted in relatively complex social sys-
tems, i.e., social systems whose populations and institutions are
heterogeneous. However, a complex system is characterized by
multiple causal pathways and feedback loops. As a result, com-
plexity in a social system is likely to hamper regulation and render
law incapable of having an appreciable, sustained influence on
conditions in the system. Accordingly, if the law that was exam-
ined in these studies was making or had made a positive contribu-
tion to society, it did so mainly in other ways, e.g., by acting as a
symbol that contributed to societal cohesion.'
1 69
It should not be surprising, then, that social science research on
operating companies has failed to uncover uniform, material inter-
company differences in economic performance attributable to the
proportion of board seats held by "outside" directors (i.e., directors
who are not employees of the firm on whose board they serve) or
independent directors generally.' 70 Of course, operating companies
are not investment companies, but as discussed supra in Part II.B,
social science studies completed to date do not permit a firm con-
clusion to be drawn regarding whether the economic returns of in-
vestment companies are affected to a meaningful degree by the
one dimension of a problem and have no impact on, or worsen, another dimen-
sion of the problem. E.g., David Neumark & Wendy A. Stock, The Labor Mar-
ket Effects of Sex and Race Discrimination Laws, 44 ECON. INQUIRY 385, 411-
14 (2006) (finding with census data on individuals that state statutes prohibiting
sex-based differentials in pay increased the earnings of employed white women
and of employed black women but reduced the level of employment among
both, and finding that state statutes prohibiting race-based employment dis-
crimination raised the earnings, but did not affect the level of employment, of
black men relative to white men).
169 Law as Symbol, supra note 9, at 299-301.
170 Dan R. Dalton et al., Meta-Analytic Reviews of Board Composition,
Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 269,
271, 278-80 (1998). The same conclusion is reached by Donald C. Clarke,
Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 73, 75 (2007).
Cf James D. Westphal, Board Games: How CEOs Adapt to Increases in Struc-
tural Board Independence from Management, 43 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 511, 512, 529
(1998) (finding that changes in board composition may not have their antici-
pated effects because chief executive officers adapt to the changes by personally
influencing directors).
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composition of their boards under section 2(a)(19). 7' Future re-
search, however, will probably find that the number and proportion
of seats on fund boards occupied by independent directors as de-
fined by section 2(a)(19) have, in general, little or no long-term
impact on the funds' investment performance. If board composi-
tion is a distinct and major influence on investment performance,
existing studies would have uniformly uncovered the effect, and
their findings would be unambiguous. Performance differences be-
tween funds seem instead to be attributable to other fund-related
factors. 172
The concepts and doctrines of law exist for a reason, however,
and as a result, investment performance should not be the sole cri-
terion for judging the composition of mutual fund boards under
section 2(a)(19) even though investments are made in mutual funds
for the purpose of economic gain. 173 An additional, but equally im-
portant, criterion should be whether the number and proportion of
interested directors and independent directors influence the func-
tioning of the social system by, for example, affecting the fre-
quency of scandals involving funds. Unlike the criterion of invest-
ment performance-which is economic-the second criterion is
sociological, and while investment performance is widely accepted
171 See text accompanying supra notes 65-68.
172 Cf Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen, Do Corporate Com-
pliance Programs Influence Compliance? 47 (Univ. of Melbourne Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 189, Sept. 2006), available at http://ssm.
com/abstract=930238 (finding that compliance by business firms with the re-
quirements of law governing competition and consumer protection was most
clearly influenced by the level of general competence of the managers of the
businesses, not by the presence or absence of formal compliance programs, and
suggesting that managerial competence and commitment to compliance, to-
gether with the depth of organizational resources, "are likely to be much more
important" than compliance programs themselves).
173 Indeed, a profit motive on the part of investors is essential if the instru-
ments issued by mutual funds are to qualify as securities. Fund investors typi-
cally seem to hold investment contracts. See generally Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v.
Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393, 395 (2004) (identifying, from prior cases, the ele-
ments of an investment contract). An investment contract is deemed by the Act
to be a security. 15 U.S.C § 80a-2(a)(36) (2000). A profit motive is an element
of an investment contract. United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
852-53 (1975).
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as a criterion for evaluating funds, the sociological criterion is
largely ignored.
The importance of the sociological criterion, however, cannot
be overstated. The social products of an organization such as an
investment company include reputation and trust, and although
these products have yet to be explored fully by social science, they
seem to be critical in the long run to the organization and to society
in general. 174 For instance, the negative publicity involved in a
scandal damages not just the reputation of and trust in the particu-
lar organization(s) in which a socially accepted rule of behavior
was violated, but it can also harm the reputation of and trust in the
societal segment in which the violation occurred. 175 The damaged
segment may be all of the organizations comprising a particular in-
dustry in the economy (e.g., all mutual funds), and under some
conditions, it may encompass the entire institution or sub-
institution in which the industry operates (e.g., the financial sec-
tor). Even if the damage is limited to a particular industry, how-
ever, the operation of society is impaired to some extent.1 76 Conse-
quently, a sociological criterion, and not just an economic
criterion, is needed to evaluate investment company boards. Unfor-
tunately, a sociological criterion raises questions that rigorous so-
cial science studies have yet to answer.
174 Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in
the Investment Industry, supra note 10.
175 Ari Adut, A Theory of Scandal: Victorians, Homosexuality, and the Fall
of Oscar Wilde, 111 AM. J. Soc. 213, 219-21 (2005).
176 Public misstatements of material facts, or omissions of material facts
from public communications, by officers of mutual funds are also pertinent to
the sociological criterion. Such misstatements and omissions can reduce trust in
and the reputation of the funds and thereby hamper the funds in raising capital
for economic activity. Congress has recognized that the federal securities stat-
utes, including the Investment Company Act, were adopted to preserve trust in
securities markets. When is a Mutual Fund Director Independent?, supra note
39, at 158-59. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 345 (2005) ("The
[federal] securities statutes seek to maintain public confidence in the market-
place.").
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IV. THE MACROSOCIOLOGICAL NATURE OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY REGULATION
By way of review, federal law governing mutual funds is
grounded on skepticism regarding the willingness or ability of in-
terested directors to safeguard fund investors from financial abuse.
This skepticism exists in spite of the explicit recognition that state
law contains fiduciary duties for directors and that interested direc-
tors are subject to the same duties as independent directors. Under
state law, the care and loyalty with which interested directors per-
form their tasks as directors must match that of independent direc-
tors. Given this parity, the skepticism directed at interested direc-
tors is illogical.
In addition to involving a logical inconsistency, law on the in-
terested directors of mutual funds is accompanied by the belief that
the prevalence of interested directors on fund boards substantially
affects the investment returns of the funds. The accuracy of this be-
lief, however, seems dubious in light of existing social science
studies. 177 These studies are buttressed by a substantial body of so-
cial science research that has found regulation to be relatively inef-
fective in altering societal patterns. 78 Consequently, it is at least
plausible, and may indeed be probable, that the relationship be-
tween board composition and fund performance is weak or non-
existent.
If we postulate that the status of directors under section
2(a)(19) does not appreciably influence the financial performance
of mutual funds as a whole-i.e., if interested directors do not pose
the economic threat to the funds and their shareholders that is
commonly assumed-two questions must be answered. First, what
advantages accrue to society from the congressionally established
maximum percentage of interested directors on fund boards and
from the actions of the Securities and Exchange Commission to re-
duce this percentage? Second, can regulatory approaches that do
177 See Ding & Wermers, supra note 65; Meschke, supra note 68. Also see
supra note 67.
178 See sources cited supra notes 163-66, 168.
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not impose a maximum on the percentage of board seats held by
interested directors benefit society as much as, or more than, regu-
latory approaches that do? The answer to the first question will in-
form the answer to the second.
The first question implicates the macrosociological proposition
that (i) the concepts and doctrines dominant in the institution of
law facilitate the operation of the society in which they exist and
(ii) when these concepts and doctrines hinder the social system,
they are abandoned and replaced by concepts and doctrines that
strengthen the social order.' 79 This two-part proposition leads to
the conclusion that, if interested directors have no appreciable ef-
fect on the profitability of investments in fund shares, existing law
on the percentage of interested directors on fund boards arose be-
cause it benefits the social system in some other way(s). The func-
tioning of a social system is improved by the creation and preser-
vation of trust, 180 and the legislative history of the Act discloses
that it was adopted to promote trust in entities that are vehicles for
collective investments in securities so that the entities would con-
tribute to the growth of the United States economy.' 8' Thus, even
though a concern with trust is rarely made explicit (let alone
stressed) in court opinions and Commission releases, Congress
evidently had an underlying sociological purpose in limiting the
percentage of investment company board seats held by interested
fund directors.
Trust, however, is not the only dimension of society affected
by the regulation of investment company boards. Through this
regulation, Congress and the Commission have probably also pro-
tected the reputation of investment companies and created symbols
of governmental concern with the welfare of investors.' 82 Symbols
179 United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337, 344 (C.M.A. 1980) ("The law is
not an end in itself; more properly it is a means to accomplish the ends of an or-
dered society. When change occurs in the conditions of that society upon which
the law is based, the law, in turn, must respond thereto.").
180 Knack, supra note 113, at 779; Lederman et al., supra note 113, at 529;
Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in the In-
vestment Industry, supra note 10, at 825-27.
181 When is a Mutual Fund Director Independent?, supra note 39, at 159.
182 Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in
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are important for maintaining and improving the operation of
groups,' 83 and in regulating investment company boards of direc-
tors, federal legislation seems to be inescapably symbolic. The
macrosociological concept of social productivity encompasses
these outputs (viz., symbols, trust, and reputation) of societal insti-
tutions and other organized groups, including business firms. 184
Because the concept of social productivity deals with an important
aspect of the institution of law, it can aid in understanding the
emergence and role of the doctrines and concepts of law in a soci-
ety.
185
In sum, the success of legislation, agency rules, and agency en-
forcement efforts should be judged at least as much by a sociologi-
cal yardstick as by one that is economic. This will not happen,
however, until the macrosociological character of law is acknowl-
edged, because an important contribution of a macrosociological
perspective is recognition that law can benefit society in ways
the Investment Industry, supra note 10, at 832.
18' Id. at 821-25; Law as Symbol, supra note 9, at 290-91.
184 Social Productivity, Law, and the Regulation of Conflicts of Interest in
the Investment Industry, supra note 10. The concept of social productivity is
more useful than the concept of social capital when considering law and its con-
sequences. Social capital is concerned with the resources of a group (including
an institution) and the advantages and disadvantages furnished by these re-
sources to the participants in the group. Social productivity, on the other hand,
focuses on the social outputs of a group and the effects of these outputs. Law, as
a social output of a group (i.e., society), has consequences, and these conse-
quences are central to social productivity.
185 The macrosociological framework for law that I am proposing considers
the political process, as the forerunner of legislation and agency rules, to be an
indicator of societal conditions. This point is implicit in the remark that
"[p]olitics is the art of the possible." Otto von Bismarck, quoted in The Quota-
tions Page, Otto von Bismarck Quotes-The Quotations Page,
http://www.quotationspage.com/quotes/Otto-vonBismarck/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2008). In my framework, therefore, criticisms that are directed at the current
content of section 2(a)(19) of the Act, and at Commission rules pertinent to the
section, should prompt a study of the social system in which the Act exists and
the Commission operates.
The political process is involved in choosing judges, too, and is an indicator
of the societal conditions that shape judicial rulings and opinions. See The Roots
of Law, supra note 9, at 636-37.
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other than by altering the incidence of targeted behavior. The ef-
fects of law are broad, subtle and elusive, and there must be an
awareness of all of the effects in order to understand the role of
law in a social system.
V. SANCTIONS FOR SHAREHOLDER EXPLOITATION
I turn now to the second question raised in Part IV supra. If
law regulating investment company boards primarily involves so-
cial productivity and is primarily concerned with reinforcing the
social system, can law strengthen society without focusing on the
number or percentage of board seats held by interested directors? I
believe that the question has an affirmative answer, and I suggest
below an approach that has not heretofore been applied to invest-
ment companies. I emphasize, however, that well-designed social
science research does not exist at the present time to evaluate my
suggestion. Barring an emergency, novel law and policies should
be adopted, and actions to enforce them should be undertaken, only
after exacting research indicates that their goals will be achieved
without major, undesired side effects.
A. A Proposal
The starting point for my proposal is the remarkable growth
that has occurred in the number of mutual funds in the United
States during the last quarter of a century. This growth is visible in
Figure 1, which uses data from the Investment Company Institute
and covers the period from 1940 through 2006.186 Mutual funds
186 INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at 97. For the period
from 1940 until 1970, the Investment Company Institute reports the number of
funds for each fifth year, but starting in 1970, the number is reported for every
year. Through 1973, furthermore, the data of the Institute combine money mar-
ket funds with other types of mutual funds (viz., funds investing in longer-term
debt securities and funds investing in equity securities), and a separate count of
money market funds is furnished beginning only with 1974. Based on these
numbers, the figure contains one time series (denoted by hollow triangles) that
represents all mutual funds, including money market funds; the data in this time
series are for each fifth year from 1940 to 1970 and then for every year through
2006. The second time series in the figure represents funds that are not money
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today operate in a buyer's market and must actively pursue inves-
tors, 18 7 and an important reason for the intense competition is the
enlarged number of funds.' 88 The numerical growth in funds has
also created a greater potential for incidents of shareholder exploi-
tation because, all else being equal, more funds present more op-
portunities for such exploitation.
market funds, i.e., funds that invest in stocks and/or in debt securities having
maturities exceeding those of money market instruments. The second time series
(denoted by solid diamonds) includes every year from 1974 through 2006. Id.
187 See Prohibition on the Use of Brokerage Commissions to Finance Dis-
tribution, Investment Company Act Release No. IC-26356, 69 Fed. Reg. 9726,
9729 (Mar. 1, 2004) (characterizing as "intense" the degree of competition for
investors when funds distribute their shares through brokers).
188 Since the mid-1980s, a noticeable decline has occurred in the percentage
of all mutual fund assets held by the largest fund families. For instance, the
twenty-five largest fund families managed 78% of the assets of all mutual funds
in 1985 and 71% in 2006. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, supra note 2, at
17. The change probably stemmed from an increase in the number of fund fami-
lies; such an increase is a logical accompaniment of growth in the number of
funds. Change in the number of fund families is likely to be a better indicator of
the trend in competition for investors because marketing efforts seem to be un-
dertaken typically by fund families, not by individual funds. However, the In-
vestment Company Institute does not report the number of fund families and the
change that occurred in this number over time.
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Figure 1. Number of Mutual Funds in the United States - 1940 to 2006
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Both of the time series in the figure reveal a rapid rise in the
number of mutual funds starting in the first half of the 1980s.
Given the current number of funds and the level of competition be-
tween them, the prospect of adverse publicity is presumably a con-
cern of directors and officers of the funds and their investment ad-
visers. A recent study reveals the damage that funds can suffer
from unfavorable publicity. The study estimated the asset outflows
from mutual funds following disclosure in the Wall Street Journal
that the entities managing the funds were being investigated or had
been sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission dur-
ing the period from 1994 through 2004.189 For the particular funds
that were the focus of the Commission and that were managed by
an entity that was sanctioned, outflows were found to average 22%
of the assets of the funds in the twelve months after the Conmmis-
sion action was reported in the Wall Street Journal.90 At the same
time, average outflows of 7% of assets were experienced by funds
that were not involved in an investigation or sanction but that be-
189 Stephen Choci & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund
Scandals, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1021, 1026 (2007).
190 Id. at 1029, 1042.
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longed to a fund family having a fund that was involved. 191 Be-
cause substantial outflows occurred not only from the particular
funds that were subjects of Commission attention but also from
other funds in the same family, it is clear that shareholders react
when they learn that the entity managing their fund may have dis-
regarded, or in fact did disregard, the welfare of fund investors,
and the reaction generalizes to other funds in the same family.'
92
Unfortunately, the study could not ascertain whether board
composition under section 2(a)(19) of the Act affected the likeli-
hood that a fund would become the focus of a Commission inves-
tigation or the subject of a Commission sanction, 93 but the central
finding of the study is nonetheless important-shareholders finan-
cially punish a fund and its fund family when they learn that the
fund manager is even suspected of unlawful conduct. Because the
shareholders' reactions remove substantial assets from the funds,
they reduce the fees that the funds pay their investment advisers
since the fees are calculated as a percentage of fund assets. 9 4 The
possibility of such reactions is presumably an incentive for direc-
tors and other affiliates of funds, including the investment advisers
of funds, to be wary of any action or inaction that is or might be
legally unacceptable and that can generate adverse publicity. The
incentive, moreover, is likely to be as strong for the interested di-
rectors as for the independent directors.
What means are available to the Commission that will publi-
cize instances in which affiliated persons of funds have exploited
191 Id. at 1050. Outflows from funds that were not involved in a Commis-
sion investigation or sanction, but that were in the same family as a fund that
was involved, were larger in total number of dollars than outflows from the fund
involved because the former funds collectively had more assets than the latter
fund. Id. at 1051.
192 The negative reaction of investors to funds that were not involved in a
Commission investigation or sanction, but that were part of a fund family having
a fund that was investigated or sanctioned, is attributable to the psychological
process of stimulus generalization. See Law as Symbol, supra note 9, at 297-98
(explaining stimulus generalization).
193 Stephen Choi & Marcel Kahan, The Market Penalty for Mutual Fund
Scandals 25, 27 (New York Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 06-
07, 2006).
194 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2000).
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shareholders? In a number of cases, the Commission has required
investment advisers that breached the antifraud section of the In-
vestment Advisers Act ("Advisers Act")' 95 to furnish a copy of the
Commission's order identifying the breach and sanction(s) both to
current clients by certified or registered mail 196 and also, for the
twelve months following the order, to prospective clients. 197 The
same requirement could be imposed on funds when their directors
have exploited shareholders or have failed to prevent other fund af-
filiates from doing so. The requirement as to funds is evidently au-
thorized by section 9(f)(1) of the Investment Company Act. 198 By
its terms, the section applies when any provision of the Act, or any
rule or regulation promulgated by the Commission under the Act,
has been breached in the past, is being breached currently, or can
be expected to be breached in the future. 199 In such a situation, the
Commission can order an end to the violation by both the person(s)
committing the violation and "any other person" that was involved
in, and that had actual or constructive knowledge of, the viola-
tion.200 Notably, the order may further
require such person to comply, or to take steps to effect
compliance, with such provision, rule, or regulation, upon
such terms and conditions and within such time as the
' 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2000).
196 For certified and registered mail, the U.S. Postal Services supplies proof
of mailing as well as proof of the date and time of attempted or actual delivery.
As a means of confirming delivery, a return receipt can be obtained for a certi-
fied letter and a registered letter. Registered mail differs from certified mail in
that insurance is available for registered mail to a maximum of $25,000. U.S.
Postal Service, A Customer's Guide to Mailing, Adding Extra Services,
http://pe.usps.com/text/dmml00/adding.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008). For in-
vestment companies that send a copy of a Commission order to shareholders,
there would seem to be no need for insurance, and certified mail would suffice.
197 E.g., In the Matter of Account Mgmt. Corp., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-
8857, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 1529, 1995 SEC LEXIS 2554, at
*18, *19 (Sept. 29, 1995); In the Matter of CapitalWorks Inv. Partners, LLC,
Admin. Proc. File No. 3-12324, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2520,
2006 SEC LEXIS 1306, at *9, *10 (June 6, 2006).
198 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(f)(l) (2000).
199 Id.
200 id.
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Commission may specify in such order.2 °1
Because a "person" can be an entity,20 2 section 9(f)(1) applies to
investment companies of all types.
Instances in which investors in a mutual fund are exploited by
an affiliate of the fund threaten a tenet that permeates the entire
Act,20 3 and such a fund will probably fail to make adequate disclo-
sure of incidents of investor exploitation in the periodic reports it
must file with the Commission 20 4 pursuant to section 30 of the
205 utAct, at least until after the Commission has learned of the ex-
ploitation. Under section 34(b), disclosure in these reports must be
complete, and the content of the reports cannot imply, let alone ex-
plicitly assert, that there has been no exploitation of fund share-
holders when there has been. 20 6 However, the likelihood does not
seem high that a fund will voluntarily and fully disclose such ex-
ploitation until after at least one inaccurate report that could have
disclosed the exploitation has been submitted to the Commission.
If the exploitation is due to conduct by a director (or other affiliate)
of the fund and involves the purchase of property (e.g., securities)
from the fund, or the sale of property to the fund, without prior
Commission approval, section 17(a) of the Act will have been vio-
lated.20 7 If the director (or other affiliate) benefited financially
201 Id.
202 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(28) (2000).
203 The objectives of the Act include protecting investors from intentional
injuries such as those that occur when funds are operated for the benefit of, inter
alia, their directors, officers, or investment advisers. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-l(b)(2)
(2000).
204 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.30b1-1, 270.30bl-5 (2006).
205 Section 30 applies to investment companies registered with the Com-
mission. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-29(a), 80a-29(b) (2000). Mutual funds, as the term is
used in the instant article, are by definition registered.
206 Section 34(b) of the Act requires the inclusion in reports of truthful
statements and prohibits omissions that cause the included statements to be "ma-
terially misleading." 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2000). Under federal securities law,
a statement that is literally accurate can be materially misleading if, by context
or wording, it prevents a reasonable person from comprehending the facts.
McMahan & Co. v. Wherehouse Entertainment, Inc., 900 F.2d 576, 579 (2d Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1249 (1991).
201 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-17(a), 80a-17(b) (2000). Section 17(a) covers both
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from the transaction while acting as an agent of the fund or another
person, section 17(e)(1) may have been violated too.20 8
In short, a breach of section 34(b) by a fund, or a breach of sec-
tion 17209 by a director of a fund that can be imputed to the fund, is
a basis for sanctioning the fund. For a breach of either section, the
Commission could require that the fund supply to current and pro-
spective investors a salient notice of the manner in which its inves-
tors were exploited. The sanction might also prohibit the fund from
seeking new investors for a specified period of time.
210
first-tier and second-tier affiliated persons of a registered investment company.
Id. Directors of a fund are first-tier affiliates of the fund under section
2(a)(3)(D). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) (2000).
208 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(e)(1) (2000). Section 17(e)(l) applies to first-tier
and second-tier affiliated persons of an investment company that is registered
with the Commission. Directors of a fund are first-tier affiliates of their fund
through section 2(a)(19)(3)(D) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(3)(D) (2000).
Under section 17(e)(1), the affiliated persons must be serving as an agent of ei-
ther their fund or another person. Investors Research Corp. v. Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n, 628 F.2d 168, 176 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980). Sec-
tion 17(e)(1) prohibits the acceptance of "compensation" by such agents, but
compensation does not include either (i) profits earned from transactions in se-
curities in the course of an underwriting or brokerage business or (ii) acceptance
of "a regular salary or wages from" the investment company. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
17(e)(1) (2000). Outside of these exclusions, the term "compensation" is con-
strued broadly and includes anything that the recipient views as a benefit. United
States v. Ostrander, 999 F.2d 27, 31 (2d Cir. 1993). This expansive definition of
compensation is not confined to the Act but seems to be found generally in law.
E.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 9 F.3d 1016, 1023 (2d Cir. 1993).
209 A breach of section 17 could also include a violation of section 17(d),
which prohibits a first-tier and second-tier affiliated person of a registered in-
vestment company from engaging in a joint transaction with the company in
which the affiliated person is acting as a principal unless the transaction com-
plies with Rule 17d-1. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(d) (2000); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1
(2006).
210 See In re Gintel Asset Mgmt., Inc., Admin. Proc. File No. 3-10930, In-
vestment Advisors Act Release No. 2079, 2002 SEC LEXIS 2868, at *33, *41
(Nov. 8, 2002). In Gintel Asset Management, an investment adviser that violated
the antifraud section of the Investment Advisers Act and the prohibition im-
posed by the Investment Company Act on trading in securities with an affiliated
registered investment company was (i) required to mail a copy of the Commis-
sion order to existing clients and (ii) barred for one year from "soliciting, mar-
keting, or advertising" to recruit new clients. Id.
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If the proposal outlined above is implemented, funds would
face not only the prospect of adverse publicity in the mass media
for an instance of investor exploitation but also the possibility that
they would be compelled to call the attention of current and poten-
tial investors to the exploitation and the resulting sanction(s). Since
investment advisers that have run afoul of the antifraud section of
the Advisers Act have been required to inform their clients of the
violation(s) in this manner,21 1 the proposal is not without some
precedent. Certified mail is unlikely to be disregarded by a recipi-
ent, and the notification to shareholders can be expected both to
enhance the symbolism of the sanction and, by suggesting regula-
tory vigilance on the part of the Commission, to assist in restoring
trust in mutual funds. My proposal, in short, has the potential to
improve the social productivity of investment company regulation.
A final point merits brief mention. Section 17(h) of the Invest-
ment Company Act prevents a registered investment company
from immunizing its directors from liability to the company or to
its shareholders for conduct amounting to "willful misfeasance,
bad faith, gross negligence, or reckless disregard of the duties" of a
director. 212 These types of conduct, of course, constitute violations
of the obligations of a director that are recognized by state law and
that are discussed supra in Part III of the instant article. Investment
company directors may thus be exposed to the possibility that they
will need to pay damages from their personal assets if the exploita-
tion of a fund is attributable to a breach of any of the directors' ob-
ligations to the fund. The Commission staff has taken the position
that section 17(h) prevents an investment company from paying
the premiums for an insurance policy that covers the types of con-
duct listed in the section unless the policy allows the insurance
provider, after compensating the investment company for damages
incurred by the company for such director misconduct, to collect
the damages from the director.21 3 While a director is not prevented
from purchasing on her or his own a policy covering the listed
211 See supra note 197 and its accompanying text.
212 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(h) (2000).
213 Exemption of Certain Joint Purchases of Liability Insurance Policies,
Investment Company Act Release No. 10700, 1979 SEC LEXIS 1544, at *6 n.8
(May 16, 1979).
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types of conduct and paying the policy premiums, 214 section 17(h)
at least symbolically underscores the need for interested directors
(as well as for independent directors) to perform capably the duties
of their office.
2 15
B. Discussion
The proposal made in Part V.A, if adopted, would join other
approaches used by the Securities and Exchange Commission to
respond to instances of financial abuse of mutual fund investors.
As the mutual fund scandal that emerged in 2003 demonstrates, the
Commission already sanctions exploiters. My proposal would not
displace such sanctions but would add to them. In protecting the
integrity of the social system, however, prevention of conduct that
has not occurred is likely to be preferable to penalties for conduct
that has already occurred, and my proposal, like the sanctions now
used by the Commission, employs penalties.
A common assumption in the United States is that penalties re-
duce the future occurrence of the behavior targeted by the penal-
ties, i.e., that penalties contribute to deterring unwanted conduct,
216
and thus penalties for an activity that has happened are employed
with the expectation that the penalties will contribute to preventing
future activity of the same type. Unfortunately, this assumption is
just that-an assumption. Notably, social science research strongly
suggests that penalties for criminal conduct, and the possibility of
penalties for such conduct, have generally no more than a minimal
deterrent effect. 2 17 Because civil sanctions are less severe than
214 Id.
215 See Release No. IC-24083, supra note 20, at 59,882-59,883.
216 Ctr. for Survey Research, Univ. of Virginia, Jan. 27-April 14, 1996,
Public Opinion Online, accession no. 280345, available at LEXIS, RPOLL File
(finding in a survey of U.S. adults that, to reduce crime, "tougher laws and pen-
alties" were believed by 59% of respondents to "help a lot" and by 28% to "help
somewhat"); Princeton Survey Research Assoc., Aug. 23-25, 1994, Public
Opinion Online, accession no. 226723, available at LEXIS, RPOLL File (find-
ing in a survey of U.S. adults that "tougher laws and penalties" were believed by
68% of respondents to "help a lot," and by 22% of respondents to help "some-
what," as a deterrent to "crime, including white collar crime").
217 Supporting research is found in Law as Symbol, supra note 9, at 300
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criminal sanctions, there is no reason to anticipate that civil penal-
ties in any form-whether the mandatory notifications that are in-
cluded in my proposal or the disgorgement and fines that the
Commission already imposes 218-will be effective in averting sub-
stantial amounts of socially harmful conduct by directors, regard-
less of their status under section 2(a)(19) of the Act.219
Nonetheless, penalties can benefit a society. While penalties
qua penalties may not appreciably curb the frequency of an activ-
ity, penalties can symbolize a societal commitment to established
social values and thereby serve "not so much to guide society, as to
comfort it."'22° In doing so, penalties are likely to help in cementing
a social system.22 1 Moreover, through as well as apart from their
symbolism, penalties may reinforce trust in the social system and
promote the reputation of organizations. There is a possibility, of
course, that such consequences will reduce the incidence of some
types of socially undesirable behavior, but the deterrence is
unlikely to be large in magnitude and, if it occurs, would be indi-
rect-the penalties would strengthen the social system, and the
strengthened social system would prevent socially damaging con-
duct.
n.65. See Chester Britt et al., A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law: Some Cau-
tionary Notes on the Use of Interrupted Time Series Designs for Policy Impact
Assessment, 30 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 361 (1996) (discussing important features of
social science research design for assessing the impact of law and finding with
time-series data and an appropriate control group that the law of a local govern-
ment regulating the possession of handguns did not affect the homicide rate).
218 E.g., In re Banc of Am. Capital Mgmt, LLC, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26756, 2005 SEC LEXIS 291 (Feb. 9, 2005).
219 The fiduciary duties of directors under state law are a form of regula-
tion. Because regulatory law generally seems to have little measurable impact on
the occurrence of the conduct with which such law is concerned, the fiduciary
duties of directors probably do not often stop either interested directors or non-
interested directors from financially exploiting shareholders. Whether directors
financially exploit shareholders seems attributable, instead, to factors other than
the fiduciary duties of directors and the status of directors under section
2(a)(19).
12 THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1935).
221 Unfortunately, sociologists have yet to identify with rigorous quantita-
tive research the degree to which, and the paths by which, the symbolism of
penalties benefits a society.
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While penalties seem to help in maintaining a social system,
penalties may contribute less than prevention to reinforcing the
fabric of a society.222 If so, approaches that prevent shareholder
exploitation but that do not involve penalties are advisable in ef-
forts to preserve the attractiveness to investors of entities for col-
lective investments in securities. Effective non-penalty approaches
will be difficult to identify, but one possibility is suggested by a
recent study. The study found that, all things being equal, the in-
vestment return of mutual funds whose portfolios were dedicated
to equity securities generally rose with the amount of money that
the directors of the funds had personally invested in their funds.
223
If the relationship between director investments and fund perform-
ance reflected a greater personal commitment to funds by directors
who were investors, a requirement that an individual commit a
specified minimum sum to a fund in order to be a director of that
fund may prevent shareholder exploitation because directors of a
fund who are also investors in the fund are likely to take actions to
avert such exploitation. However, while prevention is prudent,
none of the current provisions of the Investment Company Act ex-
plicitly authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to
compel investments by directors in their funds, let alone compel
specified minimum investments, and Congress would need to
amend the Act to provide the Commission with this authority.
Whether Congress would adopt such an amendment is an open
222 Cf Ezzat A. Fattah, Some Reflections on Crime Prevention Strategies in
Large Metropolitan Centres of the 21st Century, 7 EUR. J. CRIME, CRIM. L. &
CRIM. JUST. 130, 131, 135, 141, 146-48 (1999) (concluding that the incidence of
crime cannot be reduced by law-imposed penalties but may be reduced by cer-
tain prevention strategies).
223 Martijn Cremers et al., Does Skin in the Game Matter? Director Incen-
tives and Governance in the Mutual Fund Industry 14, 18, 23 (Yale Int'l Ctr. for
Fin., Working Paper No. 06-34, 2006), available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=686167. Another study, which included funds with portfolios con-
sisting of debt securities as well as funds with portfolios consisting of equity se-
curities, found a relationship between the amounts that independent directors
personally invested in their funds and the financial performance of the funds.
However, the causal direction of the relationship was unclear; i.e., the perform-
ance of the funds may have been the antecedent, rather than the effect, of the
amount that the directors put into their funds. Meschke, supra note 68, at 17-18.
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question.
Finally, regardless of the form it takes and the activity it tar-
gets, regulation should be informed by the findings of rigorous so-
cial science research. Because well-designed studies support the
conclusion that deterrence of conduct injurious to mutual funds
and their investors is unlikely to be achievable through law, the
mailed notification that I proposed would probably not prevent
substantial amounts of future misconduct, at least partly because
the notification would reach current shareholders only after many
if not most of them had learned of the misconduct through other
means (e.g., newspaper articles) and had reacted to the disclosure.
If the mailed notification would be unlikely to generate appreciable
additional redemptions of shares from the fund involved in the
scandal and from other funds in the same family, fund directors
and officers may be minimally concerned by the notification re-
quirement.
However, every approach to regulating mutual fund boards
should be assessed with a sociological criterion, not just an eco-
nomic criterion, because each approach requires an examination of
the influences and reactions of society, elusive and subtle as these
influences and reactions may be. Government regulation stems
from and affects society in ways that can be understood with the
tools of sociology, and studies of the regulation of investment
companies can be enriched by, and can enrich, the sociology of
law. For example, the statute establishing the maximum percent-
224 Serious problems of quality in sociology became obvious during the
1980s in the United States. The problems, which were largely caused by soci-
ologists themselves, had developed over the course of the two or three preceding
decades. Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., The Real and Unrealized Contributions of
Quantitative Sociology, 54 AM. Soc. REV. 447, 457-58 (1989); see IRVING
Louis HOROWITZ, THE DECOMPOSITION OF SOCIOLOGY 12-13, 24 (1993). The
problems have not been cured; rather, they are continuing and evident today.
Alan Wolfe, Social Skills, NEW REPUBLIC, April 23, 2007, at 56 (estimating that
half of all sociologists are currently advancing a political agenda, not science);
HOROWITZ, supra, at 9, 16-17 (concluding that sociology is in danger of becom-
ing "a pseudoscience" due to the large proportion of sociologists who are politi-
cal ideologues). For empirical sociologists, however, major improvements in
data sets and statistical techniques since the 1980s have dramatically increased
the sophistication of their research. Unfortunately, the higher quality of socio-
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age of interested directors on an investment company board, as
well as the sanctions imposed by the Commission for instances of
shareholder exploitation, are likely to furnish symbols supporting
the social order as well as promote trust in the financial sector. In
doing so, these regulatory measures would enhance the credibility
of, and hence commitment to, the social system among participants
in the system, and the benefit to the social system would occur
even if, as seems probable, the measures do not directly or indi-
rectly curb the frequency with which shareholders are financially
exploited. 5 By its very nature, a social system requires its partici-
pants' commitment, and the extent of this commitment is presuma-
bly a determinant of the degree to which the system operates effec-
tively. Thus, in efforts to understand government regulation of
investment companies, research employing a macrosociological
perspective is essential, and the exclusive use of an economic per-
spective is a mistake.
logical research has probably not markedly enhanced the reputation of sociology
as a discipline. Cf Bruce Keith & Nicholas Babchuk, The Quest for Institutional
Recognition: A Longitudinal Analysis of Scholarly Productivity and Academic
Prestige among Sociology Departments, 76 Soc. FORCES 1495 (1998) (finding
that scholarly articles and books published by faculty members in Ph.D.-
granting departments of sociology had just a limited impact on the reputation
within sociology of their departments). Nonetheless, the improved data sets and
statistical techniques in sociology permit studies of the sociological aspects of
law with a degree of rigor that was not possible a quarter of a century ago. Such
studies will be essential to understanding the manner in which law functions in a
social system.
225 Palmiter, supra note 66, at 200, 207; Meschke, supra note 68, at 18-19,
38 (finding that the percentage of board seats held by independent directors is
not related to the incidence of suits against mutual funds filed by shareholders
and the Securities and Exchange Commission).

